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EXECUTIVE AGREEJIENTS - An Eaoape from Minority Rule Over For sign Affairs
I, , , Introduction
A. .. Need of Strong Executive
B.
.
, Ccnetitutional Limitations
C. ,,The Executive Agreement
II. .Treaty-Making Power
A,
, , Condtitut ional basis for our Federal Gcvcrmr.ent
1-Treaty Po^er under Articles of Confederation
2-?hiladelphia Convention - 1767
(a) States jealous of their eoverign rights
(b) Virginia Plan for Federal Covernraent
(1) Proposal of Governor Reindclph of Virginia
(2) Provisions: No change of Federal Treaty-Iiis-king Power
(c) Thomas Pickney^s Plan - South Carolina
(1) Senate to have exclusive po'.ver Ov-er treaties and
appointments
(d) New Jersey Plan
(1) Proposed by Paterson
12) Treaty pov/er as under Articles of Confederation
(3) All acts and treaties "supreme lav»" of land
(4) Judiciary of States bound to enforce treaties
Ce) Alex-ander Hamilton's Plan
(X) Joint treaty power between President and Senate
(2) War declaration by Senate only
(f) Final Agreerrent
Executive as head of government to negotiate treaties
No popular election of President
a-later changed to direct election of
electoral college
I
..Relation of President, Senate, and House in Treaty-ilaking
1-Department of Foreign Affairs created by Act of Congress
(a) Later made Department of State
(b) First Act in 1789
(o) Result: Congress felt that it should have some control
over depart'';3nt8
(l) Control by Congress over departxnents never
practiced
2-Control by Congress of Execution of treaties
(a) Through power to withhold necessary appropriations
(1) Presidents believe that Congress is morally
obligated to carry out ratified treaty
(2) Congress retains its rights
3-Norainat ions of Ajflbassadors, Consuls^ and other Officers
exclusively made by President
(a) Appointaeiits made "by and with the advice and consent"
of the Senate
(l) Rare exception with President's approval
(b) Negotiated treaty transmitted to Senate
^1) Two-thirds vote of Senators present approves
(3) Senate may amend
(3) Senate may reject
(c) President signs final treaty
(l) Final ratification is by exchange of notes
i2) President may drop treaty if Senate amends
^3) President may withdraw treaty from Senate at will
(4) President may recommend Senate amendment
a-practiced rarely
(5) President may accept Senate Changes
a-Foreign power may refuse final ratification-
Treaty void
(6) President may coerce Senate by appeal to public
opinion
(7) President may accomplish treaty effect by Executiv
Agreement
a-Question of Constitutional legality of such
agreements
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A. .. International Settlements -.vithout Formal Treaty
l-President ial messags to Congress
(a) Informs Foreign Nations of American Policy
(b) Examples;-
(1) Monroe Doctrine
(2) ilessages of President TTilson
(o) Useful when public interest is aroused
S-Diplomat ic Communications
(a) Ivo treaty usually necessary
(b) Power necessary for efficiency in government
3-Power to Receive or Dismiss Ambassadors
a) Power exclusively executive
b) Determines relatione with countries
c) Gives President power to recognize or refuse to
recognize nations
(l) Roosevelt's recognition of Panama
B.
.
.Executive Agree?Tient3
1-Contrast between treaty and Executive Agreement
Treaty by and with advice and consent ci the Senate
Treaty is supreme law of land
Cl) Treaty may be made void by Act of Congress
(2) Treaty may be made void by o-^ficial action of
President
(c) Protocol and Convention
(1) TTot carefully distinguished from wordj treaty,
in this country
(C) Usually requires Senate approval
(d) Agreement
(1) Some international arranger^ents called "agree-
ments" are actiially treaties and not confirmed
by Senate
(e) Executive Agreements
(1) Informal.
a-Fxchange of notes settle minor differences
b-?resident alone should be responsible for
such settlements between np.tions

(2) AgresiTients listed among treaties
a-Thoss of nanor importanoe (Agreements ex-
tending time of appointing, ministers as
provided by a formal treaty)
b-Executive Agresmants under ."cts of Congress
c-Liodu8 Vivendi
d-Agreements taking the place of loriiial treaty
. History of Executive Agreenients
A,
. . Agrc-3:n3nts under Acts of Congress
1- Importance
(a) Constitutional basis
(b) -President's right over such Agreements rarely
questioned
(o) Such Agreements often relate to power settled by
formal treaty previously
3-Laws 3Jid Agreerusnts by Act of Congress
(a) Postal Agreements
il) Early postal arrangements by treity
(3) Act of June 8,1872 - President to conclude postal
arranger.ents
(3) Arrangenients under Act cf 1872
(b) Reciprocity Agreements
(1) McXinley Act of October 1,1890
a-President to stop free trade in hides, etc
when foreign tariff is unfavorable to
American agricultural products
b-Congress listed rates to go into effect
(2) Dingley Tariff Act of July 24, 16P7
a-Reciprocal trade provisions
* b-President to make convrr.ercial agreements on
enumerated articles, wines, etc., when
foreign powers agree to reduce rates on
American goods
c-Suspension of free entry of goods
d-Gen=ral reduction of 20^ to be made only
with consent of Senate
e-Agreerr.ents under Act of 1897:-
Bulgaria-1906; Cuba-19C2; Great Britain-
1907; aermany-1900, 1906 (1907 agreement
preceeding ccrnmeroial treaty) Italy-1900
Netherland8-1907j Portugal-1900; Spain-
1906; Switzerland-1906.
8git'??§iiB?:||?^3c
Page-303-2C5
-clause 52
•
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(3) Copyrights, Trade wlarks
a-Act of Congress March 3, 1691
5l8t Ceng. 2nd Sees. Chapt. 56^;. ?. 1110
Statute of U.S.
1' Copyright privileges reciprocal
Agreement m?^d= by President and foreign
povv'er will adrr.it to this privilege
b- 'greenients un'l?r Act cf March 5, IcSl:-
Austria-1907; 5elgi\im-] SGI; Chlli-18S6;
China-19C3; Denniark-1893; France-l?91;
Cerinany-1892; Italy-1B92; Japan-1905;
Mexico-1896; Netherlands-1899; ITcrway-
1905; Portugal-1893; Spain-.1895; Svritze?-
l-nd-1891,
c-Special Convention between United States and
Other Central An^erican States on Literary .
and Artistic Copyrights
1' Treaty with advice and consent of Senate
2* Treaty important for detailed arrangement
s
d-Trade Mark Conventions not Agreerents
1' Treaties with;- Austria-1871; China-
1903; Roumania-19C6.
2' Act relating to trade m^rks.LIarch 5,1861:-
7etherlands-1885; Swit2erland-lS85. 1884
LIr, Gresham failed to approve ^ct with
Greece
e-Indian Treaties
4l8t Cong-thi-f-d Sees. Ch 120-1871. Pa. 566
1* llo Indian nation to be recognized as a
power rvith rhom to make treaty
2' President and Senate make treaty with
Indians during first 80 years
3' Since 1871^ President -ririth sanction of
Congress controls Indian affairs
B.
. .
Settlsinent of Pecuniary Claims
1-By T'reaty
(a) Any settler.ent cf pe'?r;ni'^ry c"''^'r? .^ray be ath'rrtted
to the Senate

(b) Jay Treaty, of November 19,1794, provided for
oollection of debts under Peace Treaty of 1782-17S3
(c) Convention rith (5re?.t "Britain October 20,1818 for ar-
bitration of claims regarding slaves - Sec V
(d) Art. 1-Xl of "treaty of Washington May 8,1871 for
settlement of " Alabama " Claims
(e) Art, XX-XXV of same treaty over fisheries
(f) Prior to 1905, 39 cases of settlement by treity of
pecuniary claims. J.B.lvIoore - Treaties and Executive
Agreements
Pol.Sci.Ouart . - Vol XX— P. 399-403
(l) 20 cases of claims against foreign governments
alone
(Z) 14 cases of claims against both governments
(o) 5 cases of claims against the United States alone
(4} President forbidden to bind government of United
States to payment in absence of authority of law
a-Claims against United States settled by
treaty or agreement concluded ad refarandum
(g) Settlement of claims is made part of a convention for
cession of Danish '"est Indies to United States
3-3y Executive Agreement
(a) Claims against fcrei;2n governments settled by President
(1) Power not questioned app.rt from limitations
(2) Validity and finality of President's action
assert -.d in the IJora C^se when Spain attempted to
qualify our agreement
(5) History of case:-
ITovember 29,1886 settlement made by ex-
change of notes paying sfl^SC^jOCO in install-
ments. Cuban budget of 1887-1886 to pay claim.
Cortes did not p?,ss "^v.r'.^at.
J.B.Moore-Trfcc.Ui->:;o a.rij. Zxecutive
Ac^reements- ?. 403-407
Au^OLst 10,1887 Ag^rc3:-.ent signed by Mr.Olney
as Ssoretary of State for payment on or
before September 15 with interest.
Claims of Spain made on ground that Cuban
government was in ^411 exercise of consti-
tutional functions. Xo dictatorship existed.
3-3y Arbitration
(a) Under Treaties
(1) 1915 Protocol bet-'-e-n Haiti and United States for
9
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settlement of claiiria against Haiti by arbitration.
Part of Treaty of 1915.
(2) Duration of Tre^.ty of 1915 extended by executive
agreement for twenty years
(o) Treaty between United States and 03rt?in Central
and South .'\,T.erican countr' for Arbitr-.t ion of
Peciiniary Claims
a-Deoision to h-^ ../^.^^ by permanent Court of
A.rbitration at Hague
b-Iixtended without Article 7f3 in 1906
(4) 1910- Pan-American Claims to be settled by arbitra-
tion at Hague
a-Senate agreeiiient
Under Executive '^greernents
(1) 1919-Protocol for establishrrent of claiirs ccrrunis-
3 ion for claims aga.inst Haiti
a-Claims ^oniTiission of three established
Award determined by commission to be paid
by Secretary of State for Finance of Haiti
c-Haiti to issue national loan for |40 000,000
to pay off bonded indebtedness and the
awards of the claims commission. Witnesses
to attend
(3) 1915- Protocol determining amount of damages
caused by riot at Panama City^ July 4,1913
.a-Mr. Van Rappard to be arbitrator
b-Death and injury to Americans at Ccco.x j,rc\-^
(3) Protocol for arbitration of Landreatt Claim
against Peru
a-Decree of October 24,1865 provided payment
to John LandreaH'
b-Decisicn to be submitted to International
Arbitration Commission
(4) Delagoa Bay ''.ailway 1S91
a-Claims bet-ver-n United States, Creat Britain,
and Portugal ( Treaties and Executive Agree-
ments - Page 413 - Pol . Sci. Quart, )
b-Threo 3v;iss Jurists arbitrate case
c-Settlement in favor of United .Otatsa and
Creat Britain for $4,670,000

Struggle between Ser.ate an.i President over General Arbj.ur-.Lic..
Treaties
1- The Occasion
(a) Ten general arbitration treaties signed by Mr. Hays
in 1S05
(b) President Roosevelt had negotiated an agrecmer.t with
Can Doi^ingo regarding finajioes,
2-Provi3ions of treaties
(a) Senate was to pass on tre-ties before final ratifica-
tion
(b) ji^del was Treaty between C^reat Britain and France made
in 1903
(c) Differences to be settled in Permanent Court of
Arbitration at the Hague
(d) "Special Agreement" to be concluded defining dispute
and the scope of the powers of the arbitration
3-Senate attitude towp^rd treaties
(a) Believed that "Special Agreement" meant separate treaty
in each case before submitting to Hague
4-?resident Roosevelt ' 8 attitude
(a) Considered the Senate's work ended v/ith the approval
of each treaty
(b) President alone to make special agreerr:ent
5-Final action on treaties in 1905
(a) Senate substituted word "treaty" for "special agree-
ment"
(b) President withdrew tre?vties from Senate and refused t.
present them for final ratification
6-Final acceptance of arbitration treaties by President
Roosevelt in 1906
(a) "Executive Agreement idea dropped
7-Treatie8 concluded with most countries during remainder of
Roosevelt's and Taft's term of office
(a) Need cf arbitration did not appear before the World
"'ar
(b) President Roosevelt's belief that treaties would be
cumbersome was not tested
(c) In 1911 - Senate opposition against further arbitration
treaties with Great Britain, France^ and Japan
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(1) Article 111 provides that question whether
international differsnce shall be subject to
arbitration may be submitted to a "joint" Hig'h
Comr.ission of Inquiry
a-If all but one men/oer agrees, reference
will take place
(2) Senate ocntsnd that creation of "Arbitral Tri-
bunal" to which all differences shall be refer:^ed
and which is subject to Senate approval will be
abandoned in favor of joint High Coriiifliasion
which does not require Senate approval
8-Most-favored Nationa Agree'^.ents regarding Customs and
Duties with Latvia, Finland, Esthonia, Brazil and Czecho-
Slovacia, Greece, Doir.inican Republic, Quatemala, Poland, and
Roumania 1923 1925
Sea page 825 - 4m. Sen. 2 Arb , Treat ies-Living Age (Sept 1911)
D,
.
I-Importance of Modus Vivendi in Relations between United States
ani Great Britain
(a) Definition
(1) Temporary arrangement pending permanent settle-
ment
(2) Uaed by President to secure advantages of treaty
when Senate is adverse to treaty
a-Extra-legal use
b-Examples of "Modus Vivendi"
o-Impcrtance of "Modus Vivendi"
E. ,. Complete List of Important arrangements between United States
and Great Britain (brief history and discussion of types)
1-1815- Limitation of "laments on Great Lakes
(a) Later made treaty
S-1850- Protocol ceding Horse Shoe Reef to United States
|a) Mo fortification
^b) Light-house to be built and maintained
,c) P^rt of Reef ceded to United States
3-1870- Declaration adopting maps
(a) Prepared by joint commission under treaty of June 15,
1845
(1^ B-unlary at 49 th parallel determined
r•
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(b) Exchange of notes
4-1S73- ^rct^^ol of Ccnf^r3nc3 ^Tashington
a) I^oroh-west water boundary dst-^rrained
b) Cl'=>.im3 submitted to arbitration
5-1371- Protocol Settling Time for putting into effect claueea
of Treaty of May 8, 1371 in respect to Prince Edward's Island
5-1 874- Sair.e for ICew Foundland
7-1S85- Agreeirent respecting fisheries
(a) Continued treaty of 1871 throughout season
(b) Called modus vivendi
8-1388- Sarf.e rene'.red pending Senate action
9-1891- Protocol between United States, Great Britain, and
Portugal ov^^ "^rbi tra*- C^.'^.ima
10-1891- Fur-Seal fisheries in Behring Sea
(a) Later male part of a Convention for submission to
Arbitration in 1B9S
11-1891 -Copyright
(a.) Proclamation by President of United States
Cb; Made under «.ct of Congress, March 3,1591
(c) Belgium, France, Creat '^ritain, Sv^itzerland
12-1893- Protocol of Conference of Ivlay 1398
aj Preliminary to appointment of jCint commission
b) Issue-Questions between United States and Canada
13-1899- Provisional Boundary between Alaska and Canada
(a) Fi-xed near head of Lynn Canal
{b; Without prejudice to final cl^iim of either party
14-1899- Protection of Trade Marks in Morocco
(a) Exchange of notes
15-19C3- T^ecision of Alaskan Boundary Tribunal between United
States and Great Britain
13-1905- Acceptance of Report of '^oronissi oners to oc-u.plete
Award under Convention of January 24,19^3
(a) "inal boundary decision in President's hand
17-1905- Trade Marks in China

ull
18-1S06- Inshore Fisherjsa '"---ty Coast cf T... unllarxd
5 a) '!clu3 Vivendi
r>3.' ^urso Seines permitted tsmporarily
(o) o-iirAiy fishing prohibited
12-1906- Protection of Patents in Morocco
(a) Like that of Trade Marks
20-1907- Inshore Fisheries extended and amended
faj Purse saines given up by Arr^ericans
(b) New Foundland foreign fishing vessels act not put
in oper*^.tion at once
(c) Light duties and tonnage rates to be paid
21-1907- Proclamation Lowering Duties
fa) Under Act of Congress
Cb) On wines, etc.
22-1908- Modus "^ivendi regarding Inshore Fisheries revised
23-1909- Modus Vivendi - Few Foundland Fisheries
24-1907- Lease of Islands on North Borean Coast
(a) Exchange of notes
(b) British ITorth Borneo Co. to hold lease
25-1911- Minutes of Conference at Washington
(a) Objections to existing treaties regarding fishing
laws and negotiations
26-1912- Agreement adopting rules of procedure of ITcrth
Atlantic Coast fisheries Arbitration
27-1913- Extradition between Philippines or Cuam. and British
IJorth Borneo
28-1914- Preservation cf status ^-^c v.it^ respect to Protection
of Oil Interests in 'lexico
29-1914- Saa.e for I.lining Rights
30-1925- Prevention of Interference with Radio Broadcasting
by ships off coast
31-1927- Releases of property seized under American and Brit is
Trading-w i th Fn e n:y- Acts
32-YQ8t resolutions of TTashington Conference for Limitation of
Ailments not in Treaty form
f ajExtra-ter'-itcriality in China
^b; Foreign postal agencies in China
f
(c) Troops to "be withdrawn as scon as possible
(d) Railways to be placed under '^hir.eee reriil*^ t ior.3
fe) Reduction of Chinese rr.ilitary forces
(f) Board of reference for far-eastern questions
utive Agrecrerts of ^-Te-^it Iraporf.rce
-^greerrerts in the vCaribbean Region
1- Payment of Creditor i^ations by Santo Tomingo^ 19C5
(a) Dillingham to aid Dareon in arranging Flan for
Payment
(1) January 5,19^5
(b) Signing of Tjillingham-Canchez Protocol
'^l) To take over control of Dominican custom
houses
a- 45f o-p collections to be turned
over to Dominican Gcvernmert
b- 55f' to pay creditors
(2) Cor'pletsd in spite of suspicion by Dominic
ministry
(c) Opposition in Ar.erioan Senate
(1) Democrats and absent Republicans prevent
passag- of protocol during special session
(2) Senate debates over power of President
(3) Link protocol with arbitration treaty con-
troversy
(4) Senate fears President will carry out pre-
visions without forr.al treaty
(d) Results of Senate delay
(1) Continued revolution in San Domingo
(2) Creditor nations threaten to again invade
the island
'(3) Iclonrce Doctrine, an issue
a- Italian cruiser arrives March 14
1905
(4) Dominican minister of finance threatens to
resign if "modus vivendi" containing terms
of protocol is not put into operation
(5) Foreign nations willing that American
citizen be appointed collector of customs
(e) Acceptance of "modus vivendi" by President Roosevel
•f
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(1) Provisions like those of protocol
(2) Opposition by Senate
(f) Result of modus Vivendi
fl) "^arshipe prevent first revolutions
(2j United States protected custcir. houses
^3; Int-arral revolutions disregarded by United
States
f4) Little popular interest by ^rcerican people
(5) In two years J Pan Dor:irgo changed from bank-
rupt to solvent a.nd peaceful country
a-Dorinic:tn CcverniTiSnt received rr.ore
from 45f^ revenue than previously frcrr
all of revenue
1' Tew school3; navy^ and public
buil^-ings
(g) Far-reaching e^^ects of ^oosevelt's Policy
(1^ Ivicaragua Agreer.ent
(2) Furnished precedent for "^resident Wilson's
action regarding Haiti
(3) Strengthened Monroe Doctrine as implying
collection of obligations owed to foreign
nations
icaraguan Agreement
(a) History of Nicaragua
(1) Farly revolutions
(2^ Goegraphical background
^3) The proposed canal in Ilicaraguan affairs
(4) 3cackwarin3S3 of country
(5} Atterr.pte at arbitration
a-ITicaragua is chief opponent
b-Presidents of Mexico and United
States as arbitrators
(6) Conference at ^ashington^ 1907
a-Central Arerican Court of Justice
(7) Execution of Americans by Zelaya
a-American intervention
(b) Agreements with TTicaragua
(1) Commissioner to collect customs and duties fo
creditor nation
(2) Agreenient put into effect
f
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(3) Treat3^ rejected by Senate
'^^0 further - loans possible
b- Financial and political upheaval
c- Effects
(4) Iviilitary interferenc^es reneT^ed by United
States
a- Marines landed in 1°12
1' Support Tiaz C-overnment
(c) Treaty of 1916
(1) Secured exclusive option to build canal
(2) Naval bases establishsd
(3) Appeal by Costa Rica and San Salvador to
Central American Court of Justice
a- Decision of Court not enforceable
b- Failure of Court
c- Possible effect upon Central ,A,L2rican
Relations had President Ts.ft's Agree-
rnent been acceptable to Sena.te
1' Policy of United States might
have been mor? consistent
(d) Haitian Settlemorts
5- 19C4 - 1911 Agrec-r.ents serving as Modus Operandi during period
od construction of Panama Canal
(a) Acting Secretary of State^ Charles E. KugheSj trans-
mitted these with note to Senate in 1922
(1) Agreements depend on good faith rather than
upon legal character
(2) Taft Agreement 8 intended to be temporary
A- Agreen:ent should be replaced by mere
permanent arrangements with Panama
B...1- Protocol between United States and Foreign Powers at Pekin
(a) American signer
,
Rockhill, was commissioner by
executive appointment
(b) Terms of Agreement
(i) Reparations - 4,500,000 taels
[2; Punishment of Boxers
(3) Embargo on arms and aiiimunition
(4) Occupation of Ter-^itory
(5) Protection of railroads to Pekin
ff
i
(c) Importance of Protocol
flV'Cpen Boor" forced -upon European Powers
r2; Naticn^il Interest of United States imselfieh
(3) Effect upon China and the ^orld
a-Upheld China's integrity
b-Friendship between United States and
China
c-China to control own affairs
2- 1907 - 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement
(a) Japanese ^-ovsrnr::ent to prohibit emigration of Japanese
to United States
(l) Peaceful development of commerce betijreen countries
(b) Objections to Japanese immigrants by Test
(1) 1906 Cegregstion of Japanese children from
An:erican chil'lren in public schools
(S) Japan refused a treaty like that restricting
Chinese immigrants
(3) Question of treatment cf Japanese in United
Statrs
(4) 1913 - Japanese prohibited from holding land in
the State of California
(c) Termination cf " Gentleman's Agreement" by Immigration
Act of May 26,1934
(1) Clause refused admission to aliens not allowed
citizenship
a-Opposition to clause by President
CoO|idge and Secretary Hughes
(d) Attitude of Japanese and Americans determined by fear
of what might occur rather than what did occur
3- 1917 - Ishii-Lansing Agreement
(s.) Feed - Japan extending "spheres of influence"
(b) Provisions :-
ll) HecoPi-nized specip.l interests of Japan in China
(2) China's territorial integrity to be maintained
(3) Japan's present concessions unchanged
(4) Confirmation cf "Open I^oor" policy
(o) Hearing before Senate
fd; Possible Results
(e) Termination of Agreen-.snt by President Harding - 1S23
23f exchange of notes between Hughes and Hanchara
Qj. Japan
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The Armistice —-Protoccl with Lpuir. 18S8
PrelimiriSry to Peace Conference
Terms like thoea of Formal Treaty
( 1 ) Imri.estate evacuation of islands
(2) General arrdetice
13 J "^.elinqulehment of all title to Cuba
^4) Cession of Porta Rica to United States
(c) Final Treaty passes by close vote of Senate
(1) "Ultimate independence of Philippines" -
Bryan
(2) Possible effect if Senate had failed to
approve treaty
1918 - Arraiptice with Germany, Noveiiiber 11
1^1
Senate objections to an armistice, October 1918
Provisions of Armistice :-
(1) Cessation of hostilities on land and sea
2) Immediate evacuation of invaded countries
3) Repatriation by Gorrrany of inh""-:: -^"nts and
prisoners of war
(4c) Surrender of German V7ar e:iuipmcji'ii
(5; Evacuation of districts on left bank of
Rhine
(6) liC destruction of villages or public
property in invaded territory
(7) Annulment of treaties of Bucharest
(8) Surrender of submarines and warships
(c) Armistice renewed every 36 days until signing of
Leacue of Nations Treaty, June 28,1918
(d) Failure of President Wilson to take Senate into
confidence regarding negotiations
(1) Attempted amendment of League of ITations
by Senate
(2) Discussion in Senate over proposed Armistice
a-Bemand for unconditional surrender
before Arr.:i£tic3 is given
v-'^^vv^^^ retribution
1' Fear that Armistice would be
giving Germany a moral victory
c-Power of Senate over A^rmistice lim.ited
1st Cong. Record- 65th Cong -2nd
Sess. Page 11156 - 11163
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d-Prssiisnt "^ilccr. 'e i>clicy upheld by
Ger.ator Pittraan cf !Tevada
e-Pclicy opposed by Senatore Lodge,
Hitchcock^, and Poindexter
f-Cono-urrsnt Pwesolution regardir^* :rc--
posed Arrnictice
1» No ceseatior. of hostilltisa or
Arrristice without diebanding of •
armies, surrender of arms, sind
navy to United "^tates
2' "Principle of arbjtration to be
accepted "by Germany
3' C-err^any to pay cost o:*^ rebuilciing
destroyed property
4' Return of fllsace and Lorraine to
France
5* Acceptance of conditions of
President's address of January 8,
1918
(e) Armistice Convention with Austria
^1) In force -^overiber 4,1918
(2) Evacuation of all territory not held before
war
(3) Like s-^r1>^.tice with ^^e^r-iny though prsce ling
it
3- P.equirerr-ent of Senate consent for the Kellogg Pact for
Outlawing ^?.r
(a) Deceirber 15,1928, Resolution by Senator Moses of
New Harpshire to sjnend treaty
(1) United States not obligad to coerce other
nations to seek peaceful means of settling
problerr.s
(2) !Io limitation of Monroe Doctrine
(3) No impairrent of right cf United States to
defend territory or trade interests
(4) No obligations \inder treaty to which United
States is not a party
VI
1- Summary and Conclusions
(a) Constitutional check on Preeir^.ent ' s treaty power
intended by Constitutional convention
(1) President to negotiate treaty
(2) Two-thirds vote of Senate to' approve
(3) Amendment of treaty by Senate ift s^iuivalent to
rejecting treaty already signed anl substituting
another for negotiation by President
I
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a- Operation of treaty requiring ex-
.penditure may be prevsnted by failure
cf House tc make -^.n appropriation
(4) Treaty procdds makes dccret diplomacy im-
pcaaible
Badvantages of Senate check cn treaties
(l) President may negotiate any treaty -
{2) Senate is free to reject it
(3) President ignores Senate during negotiation
cf treaty
a-Senate has little knowledge cf circum-
stances surrounding negotiation
b-3ecretary Hay's opinion of Senate "no
treaty on which discussion was possible,
no treaty that gave rooui for difference
of opinion could ever pass Senate."
R.Thayer - Life and Letters of
John Hay-1915. . Vol 11-page 373
(4) Disregarding public opinion, small group of
Senators may obstruct or delay treaty
a-ITo constitutional escape
b-Executive agreement is r/ay stround Senate
obstruction
[3) Foreign Countries become impatient 77ith
'i-.-3^ican Government for repeated failurt^ -v
ratify trrjaties
a-Alliance promising help to France in
case of attack by Germany failed to be
ratified by Seinate
(6) Attempt to curtail power of President by
clauses in treaty since 1920
a- Treaty with Germany cf August 1931
1' United States not to be repre-
sented in any body under tr^aiy
without authorization of an Act
of Congress
b-Attempts seriously hamper the settlement
of special conditions as they. grise
c-Termination of Gentleman's Agreement by
Act of Congress over protest cf President
in 19Z^

(7) Gonstitational cheok on treaty making non-
existent in T^ngland and meet othar ocuntriea
(c) Remedy if Exeoutive Agraementa wera to be stopx^ed
(l) Require simple majority of both Houses for
(d) The future of Executive ^.grsements
(1) Struggle between President ir.d Senate to
continue
(2) Character of Prssident tc o jriiiine
of agree^^.snta
(3) Congress likely to keep all p^rogatives it
has
(4) iTo likelihood of Constitutional Amendment
changing two-thirds requirement
(5) Supreme Court might declare Zxecutive Agre-3
ments unconst itr.t ional
ratification
a-Senate Tould vst;^ it
a-Dif f iCiil:y of distinguishing OtiuVveen
informal and formal agreements
b-Some informal agreements are necessary
(e)
(f)
Summary of i!
Coiiclusion regarding Arr.erican Policy
rj-)utivs figreeraents
(l) executive Agreements are necessary within
limits to maintain prestige and influence of
the Unitsd States in foreign af:^air8
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EXICCUTIVJi: AQREE:>ni:NTS
An Eaoape from the Minority Rule over Foreign Affaire
1.
.
. Introduction
Whenever the vast majority of the people and a majority
of the Senate oppose ^treaty, and the President blindly continues to
advocate such treaty, the Constitutional requirement of a vote by
the Senate has proved an adequate means of preventing ill-advised
action. But when a small group of wilful men with no regard for the
wishes of the people_, their fellow Senators, or the Chief Executive,
attempt to block needed relations by treaty through preventing a
vote upon a treaty or securing the partisan opposition of a minority
of the Senate sufficient to block or kill the treaty, there is shown
a need for some method of securing the desired results.
The Articles of Confederation by their weakness in con-
troling foreign affairs had shown the need of a powerful central
control over foreign affairs. The States gave up their powers re-
luctantly but finally agreed that the treaty power should rsst with
the President subject to the "adviCe and consent" of two-thirds of
the Senators present. The increasing dominance of the Chief Execu-
tive in controlling foreign affairs has been bitterly fought by the
Senate. President Garfield and President Roosevelt, during their
terms of office, asaerted that an undefined resicUum of power should
belong to the President. Ex-President Taft declared this to be an
unsafe doctrine. The Senate has insisted that the President's action
should always have some specific authorization either in a clause of
the Constitution or by an act of Congress, (l)
"The course I followed" said President Roosevelt^, in his
Autobiography, "of regarding the executive as subject only to the people,
and, under the Constitution bound to serve the people affirmatively in
to
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cassa where the Constitution ioes not explicitly forbid him to
render the service^ was sulpstant ially the course followed by both
Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln." This policy might have received
more censure from the people were it certain that the Senate upon
all occasions dropped politics at the water's edge as both Sumner
and Ledge had recommended.
Foraigh countries fail to understand how a branch of the
legislature which has no part in treaty negoti^-tion can have power
after the final protocol is drawn up, to alter or pocket the treaty'
i
The resulting dissatisfaction from the failure of the Senate to agree
has led in certain instances to grave consequences. To some extent this
evil has been mitigated through the implied powers of the Executive to
carry on diplomatic relations with foreign powers. In this msinner^
President Roosevelt put into effect the Ccll'=iction of the Customs re-
ceipts in San Domingo although the Senate had refused to vote on the
treaty. This use of what is known as the Executive Agreement has en-
abled the President to fill in the gaps in international relations
pending a treaty. This implied power, according to Professor A.. B.Hart
and others, const itutes a serious usurpation of power which should be
checked if the Constitution is to retain its position in the founda-
tion of the American G^overnment, This opinion seems to me hardly
warranted in view of the fact that most of the agreements with the
possible exception of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement have had fortunate
results. Moreover, there is little in the account of the Constitutional
Convention which would indicate that the signers of the Constitution
considered the requirement of a two-thirds vote by the Senate as
peculiarly sacred. It was rather a last-minute compromise, which made
a later modification almost necessary. Frequently the Senate, having no
part in the negotiation, fails to understand the true meaning of the
0
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treaty.
In the lelioats adjustment of foraign relations it sesms
that the President should be unhampered by a minority of the Senate
whioh may be out of harmony with the administration or with the will
of an electorate which can never completely overthrow the peracnjgBl
of the Senatd, Necker in his essay on executive power written during
the period preca=ding the adoption cf the American Constitution said^
"The executive power is the moving force of government. It represents
in the political system that mysterious principle which in moral man
unites action to the will In reality the constitutional laws
would in vain define the functions of the executive power, 7;culd in
vain ordain that a general respect be paid to it.... .. the executive
power if not invested in all the prerogatives necessary to its auth-
ority and its credit would uselessly attempt to enforce its rights
and accomplishments
J
the ends of its inst itution.
. .
. The welfare of the
State and the most important interests of a nation depend on the wise
and prudent solution of the formation of the executive power in a
political constitution." (2)
The continued dominance of the Federal Executive sspecially
in war has contributed to efficiency and there has been no threat of
dictatorship. Public opinion can be counted upon to prevent usurpation
to the extent of undermining the constitution. Far more in this direct
tion can come from a failure of the public to obey its laws under the
constitution than from taking a power over treaties vhich nearly all
other countries admit to be exclusively an executive f-unction,
2... The Treaty Making Power
A. . Constitutional Basis.
The treaty power of the Colonia.1 period was exclusively
in the hands of the British Government. During the Revolutionary '''ar
*
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the povvera over foreign a,ffai:^e were taken over by the Continental
Congreas but^ viith the ooiting of peace ^ the old jealousies of central
power wsr^ renewed and the new States began rnaking their own arran?:e-
menta Trith foreign powers. The intrigue of foreign diplomats and the
inability of the States to conclude favorable trade agreements led to
the delegation of treaty power to Congress under the Articles of Ccn-
f.ederation. Although the power to make treaties is one of the distinc-
tive marks of sovereignty, no provision was made for an executive to
look after foreign affairs and the action of nine of the thirteen state
was necessary for ratification of a treaty. Georgia, in spite of the
restriction placed upon the negotiation of treaties by the separate
states or confederation of states, made war against the Indians and
later made treaties with them. Treaty obligations were violated con-
tinuously and the contempt of foreign governaents for American Sover-
eignty was preventing the negotiation of much needed commercial agree-
ments with foreign nations.
The drift toward governmental anarchy If^ad to the calling
of the Philadelphia Convention. The Virginia Plan of revising the cen
tral government was proposed by Randolph. This plan passed over treaty
making power leaving it substantially as it was under the Articles of
Confederation, Also "^atftrson of New Jersey preserted a states right
plan which did not change the state's control over treaty power. Never-
theless it did provide that "all acts and all treaties shall be the
supreme law of the respective States so far as f^^oss acts shall relate
to said states or their citizens and that the judiciary of several
states shall be bound thereby to enforce the treaties and laws." (5)
Thio irrpcrtant ''eclaration was embodied iv. article VI of the final
draft of the Constitution and has added much to the prestige and power
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of the Federal Government. Thomas Pinokney cf South Carol ir a pro-
posed that the Senate should have the sole and exclusive power to
declare war -^i?"! make treaties and to appoint ambassadors, judges of
the Supreme Court, and others Federal Officials, Alexander Harr.ilton;
while willing that the Senate alone should have power to declare war,
e
wanted the tijaty power to be granted jointly to the President and the
senate.
When the Convention finally decided to abolish the Articles
of Confederation ?.nd substitute a new form of government , the fact
that the President was to be the representative in dealing with foreign
nations and that the Senate, by its very nature, could not investigate
and conduct negotiations fcr treaties, compelled the convention to
give the President an equal share Tvith the Senate in marking treaties.
The electoral college, which was indirectly controlled by the people, did
not seem to the Convention a radical giving up of state control. The
Senate which represented the States equally and whose members were
appointed by the Stnte legislatures still permitted effective stats
control ever foreign arrangements. rTeverthelese, practice and pop\ilar
demand soon changed the electoral college to a body responsive to the
popular will. The seventeenth amendmient to the Constitution providing
for direct election cf Senators has permanently ended any restrictions
over treaty-making which the Convention may have been reserving to the
States. In recent years the power cf the Federal Government has grown
enormously at the expense of Stats rights.
B..The He/dtion of the President, Senate, and House of
Representatives in respect to Treaty-making.
The direction of foreign affairs is in the hands of
the President who must, however, abandon his formal international

arrangsments J which take the form of treaties^ if the Senate fails
to confirm them by a two-thirds vote of the Senators present,
previously mentioned^ Article VI of the Constitution declares that
all treaties "shall be the supreme law of the land." Except in rare
cases, the President , with his appointed officers, alone carries on
negotiations for a treaty with- the representatives of a foreign
nation. Henry Cabot Lodge has asserted that the right of the Senate
to share in treaty-making at any stage has been recognii'ed by the
Senate and the Executive frequently since the beg-inning of our Feder-
al Government. ArriOng the exarr.ples cited, he mentioned the treaty
being negotiated with the Southern Indians by President Washington
who from the first had interpreted the words "by and with adviCe and
consent of Senate" as meaning that the Senate should have some p3j:t
in negotiation as well as ratification, ^ith the intention of secur-
ing the cooperation and advice of the Senate; President Washington
and Secretary of War, Knox, entered the Senate Chamber and addressed
the Senate on the need for a treaty, ^en the Senate decided to refer
the matter to a committee, Washington, heatedly remarked, "This defeats
every purpose of my coming here." The method of Senat« procedur* has
discouraged all later Presidents from addressing Congress from the floor
with the exception of President Wilson. Washington, himself, remarked
in no uncertain terms, "I will be d—d if I ever go there agsan.
"
President Washington, in August 1790, requested advice regarding the
making of overtures to the Cherokee Indians. Again in February 1791,
Washington carefully expl^tned his reasons for sending C-c^err^U-VlTorris
in an unofficial character to England to learn whether it was poss-
ible to open negotiations for a treaty, keeping the Senate informed
of the proceedings by letter at all times. In 1794, President Wash-
ington consulted the Senate regarding the appointment of John Jay as
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envoy extraordinary to "^nsland. By doing so, he caused the Senate
not only to pass on the appointment but also to pass upon the pol-
icy which the appointment involved.
Presidents Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson,
Buchana»-ri, Lincoln, Grant, Cleveland, and others have on rar* occa-
sions consulted the Senate as to the procedure most adviseable to be
followed. Evidence shows on the other hand, that the President has
almost invariably resented unsolicited advice as to treaty ne^ctiat icn.
On the whols, it has been very unusual for the Senate to have any part
in treaty negotiations.
A notable example of the kind of treaty in which the Senate
has been invited by the President to present recommendations was the
Oregon Bciindary Treaty. President Polk agreed to conform rith the ad-
vice of the Senate because he had been elected on a "Fifty-four, forty
or Fight" platform slogan. To avoid the responsibility of going bacv
on hie untenable demands he allowed the Senate to advise accepting 4^^
degrees as the northern boundary of the United States. Had he failed to
consult the Senate it might have refused a treaty Thich was decidedly
"to the advantage of the United States even at the 49th parallel.
To the claim that the Senate should be permitted a greater
share ir the negotiation of treaties, Jay, in the Federalist explains,
"It seldom, happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature,
but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. '
There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if
the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discov-
ery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they
ari actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are
many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the Presi-
dent
^
but who would not confide in that of the Senate or still less in
that of a large popular assembly So often and so
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essentially have we s-uffered from the war.t of secrecy and dispatch
that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no
attention had been paid to these objects ....Should any
circumstance arise which requires the advice and consent of the San-
ate, the President may at any time convene them. Thus we see that
our Constitution provides that our negotiations for treaties shall
have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information,
integrity, and deliberate investigations on the one hand, and from
secrecy ani dispatch on the ether." (5)
The President is not obliged to negotiate a tre^^ty or
agreement. The quotation from the report of the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate in regard to the executive power is pertinent.
" If any given power belongs to the executive branch of the government
presumptively it does not belong to the legislative brs.nch. It is
clear all through the Constitution and has nev?"^ been disputed that the
intention was to distribute the powers of government between its three
branches subject to such checks as the veto of the President, or the
advice and consent of the Senate; and not to place any pOTV'er in two or
all three branches of the government concurrently. The existence of
the same power for the same purpose in both the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the government might lead to most unfortunate results.
As previously mentioned all appointm.ents, except luring a recess of
Congress, are subject to the consent of the Senate. The need for appro-
priations for carrying out most treaties gives to Congress a restrain-
ing influence over the treaty-r.aking power. Such appropriations must
orginate in the House of Representatives and be passed by both House
and Senate in order to become valid. Most Presidents have held that
(5) The Federalist (Lodge Flition ) pp. 403 - 404

Congr«8e is morally oblip^ated to make the neceeeary appropriations
for carrying into effect a trenty^ but Congrese, though usually com-
plying, withholle the rights to refuse appropriations at will. Final
ratification can not talcs place without approving vote by two-thirds
of the Senators present at the final voting on the treaty. Arr. 3nd-
ments may be submitted and a'fied to a treaty while it is in the Senate's
hands. The President's power over the treaty is final, as he may with-
draw the treaty from the Senate at any tirre or may refuse to submit an
air.- ended treaty to the foreigti government concerned for final ratifi-
cation. Changes in the treaty made by either the President or the Sen-
ate, may fail to meet the approval of the foreign powers and tha treaty
may therefore be dropped. Hence, a negotiated treaty takes effsct only
after passing through the ordeal of negotiation by the representatives
of the United States and those of the foreign countries concerned, appr©-
val by a two-thirds vote of the Senate, and the signatures of the Presi-
dent ani the executive of the foreign power.
3.
A. . International settlements not requiring a formal treaty.
Few would be our diplomatic arrangements , were it not for
the fact »08t business of a semi-formal nature is carried out without in-
volving the Constitutional treaty requirements. Mr. Hale says, "the
power to make treaties implies complete power over diplomatic negotia-
tions. A treaty is an express contract between or agreement between
nations. All contracts or agreements may be in form of treaties" (7)
^mong the methods of informing foreign powers of the policy
of the United Statas, is the presidential message to Congress. In such
a way the Monroe Doctrine was announced to the world. No treaty signed
by all the powers of Europe and the Americas could have been more
rigidly enforced or expanded than the Monro* Doctrine has been during
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ths last on« hundr«<l and eight years ainje its huinble beginning.
The prttsiidntial message, aa a means of informing foreign nations
•^vithoat inourring the embarrasaements of a diploraatio oommunioation
through the regular channels, is efficacious in proportion to the
strength of public approval, "^resident "Wilson used this method
repeatedly.
The power to receive ambassadors and to dismiss them
determines to a large extent the relations between the United States
and foreign countries. Congress had nothing to do with President'
Roosevelt's prompt recognition of the Republic of Panama following a
revolution from the tyranny of Colombia, Recognition was made on the
basis that the Revolution was only feebly combated by Colombia.
Treaties have been terminated by the proclamation of the President or
by Congressional action without consulting the foreign powers concern-
ed.
Diploraatio communications, such as dispatches and notes are
sent to the foreign executive through his ministers. Most negotiations
remove all necessity of making a formal treaty. It is interesting to
notice that all notes to the United States must be addressed directly
to the President, ^en the German embassy, through the newspapers,
attempted to warn American citizens of the danger of travel to European
ports, they brought upon themselves the serious condemnation of Presi-
dent Wilson. Indirectly it was a contributing cause to the breaking
of all relations ^ith Germany.
In the case of the leas formal agreements, John Basset
Moore says, " To assert that the Secretary of State of the United States
when engaging in routine business which occupies attention of foreign
offices without attracting public notice, which he has done constantly
sin^e the foundation of the govern-'.ent , had violated the Constitution
because he did not make a treaty, would be to invite ridicule, ^ith-
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out th« 3xeroi8« of suoh povsrer^ it wo-uld b« imposaible to coniuct
the businaaa of thia office. (8) *
B. .Executive Agreements.
The tericd "treaty" /'Convention", and "protocol" are used
inliaoriminately in international agreements and treaties. In the
United States, "treaty" is a term relating to a formal agreement ne-
gotiated by the President's representatives with those of a foreign
country and accepted by a two- thirds vote of the Senate, and ratified
through final signature by the President and the foreign executive.
The constitutional requirement that all treaties be voted upon by the
Senate has lead to the adoption of a method for securing the advantages
of a treaty by what ia called an executive Agreement.
The limit to which the Executiv* Agreement may go is deter-
mined only by precedent. The Executive Agreement has been used in
place of a treaty when the Senate would not permit a tre.^.ty to b« ap-
proved. Many agreements might be justified under the implied powers
of the President as Commander- in- Ohief of the Army and Navy or upon the
grounds set forth in the above quotation from John Bassett Moore. Some
of them, however mi;2ht conceivably have been set aside as unconstitu-
tional had they been brought up to the Supreme Court, Few foreign
powers have a legislative departm«nt which ratifies the negotiations of
its executives as does th?.t of the United States. The same arg-oments
which might be used to justify the appointment of a single executive
are used to support the President's power to arrange foreign affairs
when the Senate is adverse to the negotiation of a treaty. These Ix«ou-
tivtt Agreements like treaties have been made the supreme law of the
land and have been supported by Congress. It does not seem likely that
the tendency to make executive agreements in defiance of the Senate vvill
* Pol. Sc. Quart. Sept '05 —Page 389 & 390

#33
come to supplan-t th« more forrr.al treaty. A weak President would
hardly dare to thwart the wishss of the Senate, while a strong Pres-
ident would be unwilling to go against th« wishes of the public too
often. In the past, however, critic ism of executive agreements has
come more largely from the Senate than froni the public. In America
there is a growing belief that the President, since he represents the
entire nation, should dominate Congress even to the extent of modify-
ing the Constitution in any legitimate way. Gould the Senate be in-
duced to drop politics at the water's edge, as ex-Senator Lodge has
suggested, the executive agreement would properly be regarded as execu-
tive encroli^hment on the Constitution, but as long as politics can
control the Senate's action in regards to foreign affairs, seme basis
for settlement should be found. It does not seem to ice that the
Constitution is threatened in any way by a judicious use of the execu-
tive agreement. The nation is likely to gain by the increase in the
President's power over foreign affairs.
The constitutional requirement has meant the holding up of
many important treaties when they were most needed. In support of the
Senate's power in treaty making, it may be urged that the Senate's
action prevents hasty and ill-adviaed treaties. The President knowing
the difficulties of securing Senate approval negotiaties only thos«
treaties whose importance is duely recognized, ^en the need of quick
action by a responsible executive arises, as in war time, the powers
of both Houses of Congress are reduced and those of the President are
increased to meet the emergency. Moreover secret diplomacy and secret
treaties with foreign nations are not possible when the Senate is
required to vote on the treaty. It is this secret diplomacy so common
in Europe that was the greatest obstacle to the Kellogg Peace Pact for
the outlawing of war. It is further argued that any increase in the
President's power over treaties would weaken the prestige of the Senate
and hence the prestige of the State governments which the Senate pecu-

liarly repr«sent8.
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4., History of Txeoutive Agreements,
A, . A complete list of all the agreements made during
almost one hundred and forty years of government 'under the Consti-
tution would mean constant repetition. Many of the agreaments
listed in the three volume Compilation of Treaties, Conventions, and
Agreements - 1776 - 1928 (Sj * are of little or no significance in
the discussion of the President* s power to make agreerr.ents without
the necessity of Senate approval. Among the hundreds of executive
agreements certain types stand out as important. The power of the
President to make some type of agreement has never been seriously
questioned.
5. .
A, . Agreements under Acts of Congress.
The advantages of the Executive Agreement over the treaty
method was recognized by Congress when it authorized the President to
make arrangements with foreign powers to settle certain specified con-
ditions. The right of Congress to delegate such power may be justified
under the alaatic clause of the Constitution which permits Congress "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof. (lO)
An act of 1873 authorized the postmaster-general with the
advice and consent of the President to make postal treaties, and re-
duce or increase postage rates on mail to or from foreign countries and
to make regulations which would counteract adverse measures made by
foreign countries against the mail from the United States. This was
one of the more important delegations of power to the President. The
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uncsrtainty and delay in iea.ling -riith reciprocal postal regula-tions
as a result of requiring Senate action on postal treaties had made
this act expedient.
Tariff has been a controversial question =incft the days
of Alexander HarLilton. The xMcKinley Tariff of 1890 contained a recipro-
cal trade provision by which the President was to suspend free entry of
certain articles frciii countries imposing duties on certain Americaii
agricultural products, (ll) The rates of duty on sugars, coffee, tea,
and hides in case of suspension of the free introduction of such
articles was enumerated by the act itself. The act was later questioned
as involving an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the execu-
tive branch o-^ the government. The Supreme Court in 1831 upheld this act
by declaring that "Congress can not delegate legislative power to the
President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integ-
rity and maintenance of the system cf governirent ordained by the Con-
stitution. The act of October 1,1890 in the particular under consid-
eration is not inconsistent with that principle. It does not in any
real sense invest the President with the power of legiBlaticn
Congress itself prescribed in advance the duties to be levied, collected,
and paid on sugar, molasaes, coffee, tea, or hides produced by or ex-
ported from such designated countries, while the suspension lasted
.nothing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legis-
lation was left to the "^resident Legislative pov«rer was exercised
when Congress declared that the suspension should take effect upon a
named contingency. VThat the President was required to do was simply
in the execution of the act of Congress. It '.vas net the making of the
law. He was the miere agent of the law-miaking department to ascertain
and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect. "/a^

The principls of r©'?iprocity without requiring a forrrial
treaty was reintroduced by a clause in the Dingley Tariff Act of July
24^ 1897. Certain specified items were to be admitted at a stated rate
whenever the President considered that rates were made by foreign
countries justifying such action. In addition, reciprocity covering
reduction of all dutiable articles up to ::Ojt of the former duty ccund
be made by a forraal treaty with Senate approval.
Under the latter clause, a r-^olprocal tariff treaty was
made with Cuba in 1902. (This act is still in ef:^ect) Agresrr.ents re-
ducing the tariff on imported wines, brandies, argols^ paintings,
statuary and a few other items were made rlth France in 1998; Portugal,
Germany, and Italy in 1^00; Bulgaria, Spain, and Sv/itzerland in 1906;
Great Britain and the ^Tetherlands in 1907, Several of these were
supplemented by later agreements. T7one are in effect at the present
time.
In 1909, a clause of the new tariff act (13) provided that
whenever the ''^resident was convinced th/^t any country was discrimiinating
against the Commerce of the United States, a higher scale of 25^ ad
valorem in addition to regular duty, might be put into effect by pro-
clamation. Nearly all the agreements under the tariff act of 189*^ were
jepealed in 1909 or 1910 by the action of the United States. This action
-was provided for in Tariff Act of 1909 ( 14 - sec #4)
The granting of power to fix retalijjory tariff rates to the
President ^while entirely legal^ is capable of grave abuse. Both the
Economic Committee of the League of Nations, and the International
Cham.ber of Ccm.merce have condemned the W^5ty^{^. of tariff'i^as weapons
^ economic warfare.
Most-favored-nation treatment has beer frequently violated
in spirit by the policy of the United States to grr^nt conditional most-
^1?
favcred-nat ion tTeatment. This type of most-fa,vored-nat ion clause
applies only to gratuitous concessions. Reciprocal reductions of
tariff r'^tes by the United States and another power such as Cuba wOuld
not permit a third power to claim such reductions even though it offered
to make the san.e concessions. The only remedy would be a special treaty
(15) In October 1923, a step by the United States was taken to elirr.inate
discriminatory tariff agreements by terminating, through an exchange of
tiotse, the preference arrangement, which in 1904 was made, reducing the
duties on American flour, with Brazil. Argentine had protested that her
flour trade with Brazil ras hindered by this preference to the United
States. Unconditional moet-favored-nat ion treatment, except in the case
of Cuba and our dependencies, is now an accepted principle in the United
States as well as in Europe as a result of the abrogation of this arrang
rcent with Brazil. The Tariff Act of 1922, section 317, provides that
the President may im.pose additional duties on im.ports from: any country
discriminating against t^e imports from, the United States. If this
procedure is not effective he may prohibit the entrance of that
country's goods. This mode of procedure is both inconsistent and
dangerous sir^e the act penalizes colonial preferences granted by for-
eign countries to their dependencies, while the United States continues
to make special concessions to its own dependencies and to Cuba. This
might lead to retaliatory mieasures resulting in war.
An Act of Congress, March 3,1890, authorized the President
to admit citizens of foreign nations to the privilege of copyright in
the United States whenever such nations agreed to extend to American
citizens the same benefits that are offered to their own citizens or
when those nations are parties to a reciprocal international copyright
Agreement to which the United States at its pleasure may adhere (16)
Xgreements under this act were made rith Creat Britain, Francs, and

Switzerland, and Belgium in 1891; the German Empire and Italy in 1892;
Portgoial and Denmark in 1893; Spain in 1895, Chili and Mexico in 1896;
Netharlania in 1399; China in 1903; Norway in 1905; and Austria in
1907.
Extradition arrangemanta have been entirely subject to
treaty or Congressional action. The Executive Agreement has not been
permittcid, Mr. ^illoughby says, " Reasoning cn general principles
there would seem to be no constitutional objection to such legislation."
The only case of extradition without specific treaty or delegation by
Congress of pc^er to extradite was the surrender to Spain of one
Arquellea by Lincoln in 1864. height of opinion seems to be that the
President, without act of Congress, can not constitutionally extradite
'/rithout authority expressly conferred by a treaty or a statue. We do
not extradite fugitives to countries with which ws have no treaty.
Trade mark conventions have been largely a result of treaty
between nations. Among the many treaties providing for reciprocal
rights of trade mark are those ^vith Austria, 1871; one with China in
1903, which was m°db part of a general commercial treaty; Rcuii»ania in
1906; with South American countries represented at the Fourth Inter-
national Congress of irr.erican Statas in 1910; the Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property made in 1911, which revised a Con-
vention signed at Paris in 1883, by most of the powers of the world,
"everthclsss, several agreements have been effected by exchange of notes
regarding protection of property or trade marks in co'untriss where
police power is not fully recognized. Among these agrfcex7ients was one
in 1913 between Sweden and the United States relative to the reciprocal
protection of Industrial property in China. This agreement, like most
of the others, states that 'protection will be afforded in accordance
'.•ith the laws of Sweden, for the inventions^ designs, and trade marks
wi .itizsns of zhe United States duly patented or registered in Sweden

against infringement in China by persona under Swedish consular
jurisdiction. To that end the Swedish consular courts and the Swe-
dish courts to ^.vhich the judgement of Swedish consular courts may be
appealed^ 'vill be competent to hear all such cases presented by
American CitikLQns." (17) A similar declaration was made by the United
States regarding Swedish subjects. The reciprocal protection of trade
marks in China was made possible by an agre^^ment between Denmark and
the United States, between Mr. Brun and I^r. Root in 1907. Another was
made with France regariing China in 1905; Oreat Britain in 1S04; Italy
in 1905; Netherlands in 1905; Russia in 1906, In regard to trade mark
rights in Morocco ^ agreements wer^ made with Germany in 1901, Great
Britain in 1899; Italy in 1903.
An agreement, almost identical with the foregoing agree-
mentSj concerning the protection of trade marl's in China, was made
between the United States and Japan In 1308 by a fori^.al treaty. The
Senate ratified it on May 20, 1908. (18) There sesms to be no fixed
government policy as to the msiking of treaty or agreement regarding
trade jiarks. However, all the dirsct negotiations regarding trade
marks in the country concerned were by treaty. This was «ven tried
in the case of the tiny Duchy of Luxenburg in 1904. The departure
from custom in the case of Japan in 1906 was only temporary as was
shown by the agreement in 1910. Patents in Morocco were protected
under an agreement with Great Britain similar to the one regarding
trade marks in 1907. A formal^in 1906 arranged for a reciprocal
protection of patents with Guatemala. Frequently as in the case of
Spain this was made part of a great commercial treaty.
Indian Treaties during the first eighty years were made
exclusively by the President and the Senate. An Act of Congress in
1871 (19) made all Indian arrangements subject to control of the
/
henceforth rtioognizsd as
treaties.
3, , Settlement of Pec^oniary Claims
Before 1909 there were some sighty-five treaties, agreements^
and oonventions relating to the settlement of claims. Of these more
than thirty-nine settlements were first made by treaty. The President
is forbidden to bind the Federal Government to payment of money in the
absence of the authority of law and he has not undertaken such settle-
ments excepting through a treaty. On the other hand, pecuniary claims
against foreign govsrnments have been constantly settled by the Presi-
dent. No question aside from discussion as to the possible limitation
of such power has apparently been raised.
In 1686, when the Spanish Government wished to qualify an
agreement concluded with the President of the United States, th'e valid-
ity and finality of the President's action wers vigorously asserted. (3Q)
L£r. i^oret, the Spanish minister, had agreed that Spain should pay
4^1,500,000 in settlement of the claims of Antonio Maximo Mora, a natural
ized citizen of the United States, but of Cuban origin. The claims
against Spain arose over an embargo made against his property. The
Cortes of Cuba had avoided payment under the agreement by refusing to
pass the appropriation bill containing a clause inserted by Spain for
payment of the account. The Spanish Government, unable to make the
Cortes pas3 the appropriation, wished to rsviss the agreement , making
.it contingent upon Cuban acceptance of the bill. Delay resulted but
the United States insisted that the vol-ont-^.ry agreement already made
was a constitutional obligation uy opain pay the amount stated,
Spain finally agreed and paid not only the amount due but also
interest from the time the first agresroent was made.
President and Congress. ITo Indiaji power was
having the sover§.gn t;y necessary to conclude
6I
Inoluding the more formal settlements, according to John
jassett More, writing in 1905, " there have been thirty-one cases in
which claims against foreign governments have been settled by execu-
tive agreement, Twenty-aeven arbitrations have been held under such
agreements as against nineteen under treaties which involved claims
agaiast foreign governments alone," (2{t)
In 1891 the United States, Great Britain, and Portugal
ref-irr^id to arbitration the claims against Portugal on account of the
C\!:.r of the Delagoil Bay Railway Concessions given to Ai^.^rxjan
and English Railway owners. This was accomplished by Executive
Agreement at Berne, June 13,1891, The case was ref-srred to three S^/:iss
Jurors who rendered an av/ard of $28,CC0 plus 15,314^000 francs^ in
Swiss lawful money with interest at 5>-,
In 1897, Patrick Shields was paid 1^3,500 by the government
of Chili as a result of an agreement with the United States. In 1SC2
Oeorge C. Benner's claim for damages caused by Brazil was submitted to
arbitration by executive agreement.
The Claim of the San Domingo Improvement Company against the
Dominican Government was likewise submitted to arbitration by executive
agreement in 1903. The amount of payment was determined in the agrse-
msnt as being the sum of $4,500,000 but the method of payment was to be
determined by arbitration. The board of arbitrators rendered a reward
and provided that the Custom Houses were to be turned over to a
financial agent of the United States for collection.
The Venezuela Claims offered a series of treaties and agree-
ments since 1852. In that year a protocol was signed ^without Senate
agresment^ settling^with a payment of i?91, 0'^O^ the claims against Venezuela
on account of the seiaur« anl conf isicat ion of five ships. In 1859, 1866,
1SS5, and 1858 ^ treaties settled claims of the United States against
Venezuela. In 1892 claims of Venezuela against the United States and
f
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claims of the United States against Venezuela were submitted to
arbitration by treaty- In 1903, a protocol with Venezuela submitted
to arbitration ail claims of United States citizens. An award of
ov*r $2,000,000 vvas made to the United Statsg.
One of the most notable examples of the effect of execu-
tive agreement was the Venezuela dispute of 1902. The agreement came
after Great Britain, Germany, and Italy had joined in blockading
Venezuela's ports. The claims against Venezuela were similar to those
frequently made against other unstable Latin American Republics. Rev-
olution had prevented settlement of the claims. The European powers
satisfied that President Roosevelt would not interpret the Monroe
Doctrine as guarant^ng a nation against punishment for just debts,
decided to use force. President Roosevelt felt that the blockade was
an attempt by Germany to test the firmness of the Iwonroe Doctrine in
respect to South America. The powers refused adjudication of the
controversy before the Hague Tribimal. The German ambassador, Von
Holleben, was informed that the United States would interfere to de-
fend Venezuela if arbitration were not accepted as a solution. The
entire fleet under Admiral Dewey began maneuvering in the CarribbesLn
Sea. The Kaiser finally yielded and and the danger of war was averted,
Vanezuela was forced to pay reg-alarly through the medium of the United
States. Her customs officers v/ere threatened with seizure if her
payments wera not made. Germany, Italy, and Great Britain were given
preference in the settlement of claims. Thirty percent cf the customs
revenues of La Guaira and Puerto Cabello were set. aside in payment to
^European powers , under an agreement between the United States and
Venezuela |in 1S03.
In 1909^ a protocol was signed between Venezuela and this
country regarding the claim of the Orinoco Steam Ship Company, The
If
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signatures of both countries to the Second Peace Conference at the
Hague in 1907_, had made arbitration of the dispute obligatory. The
decision of the arbitratcrs vras confirmed in an agreement bet^jreen the
two countries in September of the same year. Venezuela was to pay
^lo55,000 in gold in settlement.
In 1915, the United States made claim against Panazna for
death and injuries to American citizens during the Cocoa CJrove Riots
at Panama City, July 4,191'2, Mr, Van Rappard, minister from the
Netherlands, ..3.s to arbitrate the claims. The award favored the
United States.
Under a clause in the treaty concerning anoes of Haiti,
A
a protocol Tiras Ira^rn up in 1919 establishing a clain:a ccminission to
determine the amount of just debts due to foreign citizens and countries
The Haitian Government agreed to issue a national loan of |"40,000,000
-tc pay off her bonded indebteviness and the awards which should be a;ade
by the Claims Commission. This was another instance of the United
States by agreement trying to settle the debts of a weaker nation.
Another of the recent examples of settlement of pecuniary
claims by agreement was signed at Lima, Peru in 1921, It provided
f.or arbitration of the Landreau claim arising from a decree of October
24, 1865^ providing payment of rewards to John T. Landreau, brother of
John Celestine Landreau fOlT discovery of guano deposits. The decision
was left to the International Aipbitral Commission and sm award was
rendered to the United States.
C,. Struggle between Senate and President over Arbitration Treatie
The attitude of the Senate toward executive agreements took
effective form during the several attempts at providing compulsory
arbitration of disputes by treaty. The success with which many
£
arbitration settlements had been made between Canada and the United
States encouraged further consideration of this ncvei method of
solving international problems without resort to war. In 1899 the
first Hague Gonfersnce established what -ras called the Permanent
vyourt of International Justice-. The Second Hague Conference ^ in
1907
f
tried to establish a truly permanent tribunal composed of
judges who should devote all their time to settlement of interna-
tianal affairs in accordance with Secretary Root's reoomnieniation,
(23) The atterupt failed because of disagreement over the method of
selecting judges. The forr.er court was continued. Only eighteen
cases J all of which were unimportant, have been settled by the Per-
manent Court of Justice. Each case was settled independently of all
others as the personel of the Court changed each time. The Court
has lacked the confidence of the World and has recently been eclipsed
by the ^orld Court which has a p/ermanent character that the old Court
lacked.
During Nove^iiber, December^ and January^ 1904 and 1905^
Secretary of State Hay had signed ten arbitration treaties with the
foreign ministers of Fraiice^ Switzerland, Portugal, Great Britain,
Italy, Spain, Austria Hungary, Mexico, Sweden, and Norway, A sim-
ilar treaty with Japan was not transmitted to the Senate. These
treaties were based upon a model of an arbitration treaty between
Great Britain and France which had been made in 1903. The most
important articles in these treaties were that differences which may
arise of a legal nature or relating to thte interpretation of treaties
existing between the two contracting parties and which it may not
have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration established at the Hague by the
Convention of July 39,1899 provided, nevertheless, that they do not
I
^f-^ect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the
twc coiitiraoting parties and do not concern the interests of third
parties. (33) This clause left the definition of " vital inter-
ests" and the determination of what constituted a third party, or
the " honor " of the contracting parties to be defined in each
case. The second article created a storm of protest from the
Senate since it read, "in each individual case, the high contract-
ing parties before appealing to the Permanent Court of Arbitration
shall conclude a special agreement defining clearly the matter in
dispute and the scope of the powers of the arbitrators, and fixing
the period for the forxnation of the Arbitral Tribunal and the
several stages of prodadure. (24)
At the time these treaties were pending. President
Roosevelt was negotiating his famous financial arrangement with
Santo Domingo. The Senate fearing that the President intended to
conclude the arrangements without submitting it to the Senate de-
cided to oppose his wishes in regard to the arbitration treaties.
The words, "special agreement", in article two were interpreted by
the Senate to mean a formal treaty with the consent of the Senate.
S3 would be expected. President Roosevelt took the opposite ground
saying the Senate approval of the treaty would complete all necessa-
ry legislative action and that the executive should carry them into
effect as occasions should demand. A new treaty for each arbitration
problem would necessitate nee:!les8 delay and the original treaties
would be reduced to a mere statement of willingness, in general, of
the countries to arbitrate and yet permit an adverae Senate to pre-
vent arbitration whenever it so desired. The interpretation which
the Senate favored was considered to be step backward rather than

forward by President Roosevelt, Senator Cullom received a latter
of protest embodying these ideas. The Senate %oted upon this
letter immediately^ by striking out the word " agreeiLsnt" and sub-
stituting the word " treaty " making it compulsory to conclude a
special treaty each time a matter for arbitration should arise.
The amended treaties were sent to the President who announced that
they would not be submitted to the other countries for final ap-
proval
^
as he considered that the action of the Senate constituted
disapproval of them.
Through the efforts of Elihu Root and the foreign min-
isters concerned a series of treaties were made like those which
the Senate had previously approved which were to run for a period
of five years. They were renewed until recently at intervals of
five years ^with Senate acceptance. -"rticle two of these treaties
differed from those of 1905 by declaring that the countries "shall
conclude special agreements. It is understood on the part of the
United States that such special agreements will be made by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Presi-
dent Roosevelt now took the point of view that the principle of
arbitration shoull be accepted even though the cirrying out of these
treaties might involve difficulty. The arbitration of the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries dispute ^signed January 27, 1909^ came under
the Arbitration Convention of April 4, 1908 ^ between this country and
'!Jreat Britain. In that same convention, Great Britain acknowledged
her own lack of control over Canada and Australia by inserting a
clause which " reserved the right before concluding a special agree-
ment in any m,anner affecting the interests of a self-governing Domin
ion of the British Empire to obtain the concurrence theAn of the
Covernment of that Dominion." Arbitration treaties similar to the

one with Great Britain were made with China, Denmark, France,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Ilorway, For tuzal^ Salvador
,
Spain and Switzerland in 1908; and with Austria, Coata Hioa,
Haiti, and Paraguay in 1S09.
In 1910, President Taft negotiated treaties which male
arbitration compulsory for all controversies that were " justivoiable
by reason of being acceptable of decision by the application of the
principles of law and equity." Disputes ae tb whether or not the
case^ustioiable was to be deterr.ined by a joint High Commission
of inquiry composed of three members from each country, whose de-
cision should be final. The Senate struck out the
'
provision for a
Commission. Its action was to some extent due to a feeling that
article two ^ requiring " the advice and consent of the Senate" for
determining the conditions for arbitration which the Senate had so
carefully guarded ^would now be discarded in favor of the Comriussion.
This motive was covered by the Senate affirmation that the creation
of a Commission would infringe on the soverigr ty of the United
S'tates.
In 1913, Secretary Bryan, with President 'Wilson^s appro-
val, renewed the arbitration treaties of 1908 and 1909 as they ex-
pired, puting in the proviso: " that all questions of any nature what-
soever, which diplomacy failed to settle, should be submitted to an
International Commission and that the nations should agree not to
declare war or begin hostilities during the investigation of this Com-
mieaion.*' (25)
On January 25,1926, the decision of the Senate tc ^cin the
Tcrld Court created by the League cf Nations, afforded the second
opportunity of the Senate to use its new rule for closure made in 1917,
If
Formal debates on the subject had been going on sirce- December 17^
1925. The Senate^at that time^ decided to adhere Lc the Forld
Court but foreign countries up to the present have refused to accept
the aiLendruents iiade by the Senate. (26) ^t ahcut the sair.e time,
June 1S23 to June 1924, the arbitration treati^sj v;cie z^^cxlit. icjnevved
with the proviso:- that certain disputes might be referred to the
Torld Court after the United States adhered to the protocol. (27)
Arbitration has heer. hindered by the "vital interests"
bug-a-boo and the fear that the American Senate mould lose its
prestige by granting the President too much power in international
settlements. Up to 1820^ the lack of a real International Court of
Justice has contributed to the slow development of arbitration.
The world has need for some sure means of settling disputes without
recourse to war as chemical warfare seeir^s likely to destroy nations
which continue such warfare,
D. . Agreements between the United States and Great Britain.
It has been a source of wonder to many European observers
that the United States and Canada have succeeded in living side by
side without fortification upon the borders. To a large extent this
has been due to settlement of differences by diplomacy. A discussion
of the agreements between the two great English speaking nations
would be difficult without understanding of the mode of agreement
known as the modus Vivendi. The "modus vivendi" is a temporary or
working arrangement for bridging an international difficulty pending
the permanent settlement by treaty. In several important cases as
the agreement with Santa Domingo, it has beer used by the President
when opposition to a treaty prevented Senate affirmation or when the

Senate showed too great a tendency tc delay or an.end. For many
years, fishing agreere^te tetv;eer. the United States and Canada were
n.ade possible by a n.o^ue vivjndi ^renewable each year.
The cordial relations between Great Britain and the
United States since 1815, which have been interrupted only by the
attitude of the former luring the Civil ""ar, have perr-itted ex-
tensive use of the Executive Agreement betv/een these two countries.
As early as 1850^ a protocol was signed at London by the /rierican
minister Abbot Lawrence, and the British Secretary, Viscc-ant
Palmerston. Provision was made for ceding Horse-shoe Reef tc the
United States on condition that no fortifications should be made^ and
that a light-house should be erected and maintained by the United
States. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster^, was responsible for the
conclusion of the arrangement. Although the Senate had not ccnfirn-ed
the protocol. Congress approved the arrangeruent in an indirect marjaer
by appropriating money for erecting the light-house. This was built
in 1656. This agreement, while not changing the boundary cf the
United States, did, in effect, increa.se its ter-^itcry v.ithout formal
treaty. It may be questioned, however, as to whether a similar arrang
ment could be made with any ether country without arrusing a storm cf
protest from the Ar.erican Senate and a refusal to appropriate the
necessary funds regardless of the desirability of owning such property
ITc other important territory has ever been talren over without formal
treaty ^although the independent country of Texas ?/as annexed by
a joint resolution of Congress.
In 1870, the declaration approving and adopting maps
prepared by a joint Commission for surveying and marking the North-
west Boundary between Canada and the United States was approved by
exchange cf notes. This is an example of an agreement carrying out
c
the terms of the treaty cf June 15^1846 which fixed the bcundary
at the 49th parallel^ and is probably a purely executive function.
The determination of the meaning of the "mid'.i.le of the
channel" separating Vancouver Island from the United states was
referred to the Fmpercr of Germany for arbitration in 1873. The
protocol making this provision wSs not voted upon by the Senate.
Great Britain had claimed that the terms cf the treaty of 1846 in-
tended the middle of the channel to mean that the boundary should
pass through the Rosario Straits^ while the United States contended
it should go through the Canal de Karo. The award was made in favor
of the claims of the United States.
The time at which articles in the treaty of Washington
of May 6, 1871, refer ing to Prince Edward Island, should go into
effect was determined by a protocol signed by the President alone in
1873. A similar agreerr.ent regarding the fisheries provisions for
ITew Foundlani in the treaty was signed three years later. This power
of the President to carry out a treaty, while it is purely an execu-
tive function, enables the "^resident to put the treaty into effect
or to refuse to enforce a treaty.
The Treaty of September 3,17^3, thanks to the determin-
ation of the New Englander,^ John /dams, had granted important rights
to the fisheries off New Foundland. Vergennes declared that the
British had bought a peace instead of making one, so favorable were
the terms granted by Great Britain to the United States in that
treaty. This importsjat fisheries concession was destined to be a
frequent cause cf friction between the two nations. The treaty of
1818 at the same time that it fixed the boundary of the United
States, west of the Lake cf the '^oods,at the forty-ninth parallel, re-
stored to this country the right to catch, dry, and cure fish on
I I
certain extensive coasts of Labrador and New Foundland and to use
all the ..-..-.adian ports in case of distress or need of food. The
need for the Treaty of 1818 arose from the fact that the United
States claimed the fisheries provisions of the Treatj^ of 1783 to
be of peculiar character and not able to be abrogated by a war
between the countries Involved, The reply of Lord Bathurst was
decisive^ "To a position of this novel nature Great Britain cannot
concede. She knows of no exception to the rule that all Treaties
are put an end to by a subsequent ^ar between the Parties." (28)
The Treaty of 1818 ended the controversy.
In 1854, a Reciprocity Treaty was made, which in addition
to granting reciprocal navigation rights on Lake Michigan and the St,
Lawrence River, defined the rights of Canadian fishermen more clearly
and admitted Canadian fish into United States ports free of duty. The
action of the United States terrr.inated this treaty in 1866. To pro-
tect British interests in the fisheries a small fleet was kept in
the Labrador region. The friction resulting from the reluctance of
American fishermen to give up their former practices was allayed by
the Treaty of Washington in 1871, The Canadians felt that the Amer-
icans were given too great an advantage by this treaty. The /mericp.ns
caused much ill feeling by using larger seine^Sthan those of the New
Foundland fishermen. Light and harbor 6.VL€b were disregarded and
fishing on Sunday ^which was denied to Newfoundlanders ^ was indulged ir
by American seamen. Little respect was paid to the local customs and
regulations of Canada, The people of Newfoundland and Labrador re-
taliated for American .Treaties by restricti'-g the sale of bait. The
Treaty of 1871 expired on July 1,1885.
Up to this time^all reg-ulations of the fisheries had been
by means of treaties, ^en these treaties came to an end friction
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bordering upon v?aj resulted. To avoid a recurrence of the dis-
turbances after 1866^ a modus vivenli was put into operation ex-
tending the Treaty of 1871 throughout the season of 1885. 1^1 th
n.inor changes this agreement wab i ji^. -ed annually until 1908 when
a general arbitration treaty was drawn up and the entire question
was referred to the Hague Court of Arbitration for settlement.
The award made in 191v0 jWhile recognizing the right of Great Britain
to make resonable regulations concerning American fishing, upheld
the rights of Americans on the coast of Newfoundlp.nd under the
Treaty of 1618. The Americans were allowed to employ foreigners on
their ships and to land in bays and harbors for the purpose of dry-
ing nets, buying bait and salt, and curing their fish provided no
interference was made with the local inhabitants. A permanent
Fishery Commission to settle all future controversy was recommended.
The period from 1885 to 1P08 as has been stated was
bridged by a series of executive agreements. Many of these decided
cases which between less friendly nations m.ight have beer a cause
for war. The arbitration treaty which was pending luring this .period
was repeatedly rut off because of Senate inaction. If the United
States were to retain any of her fishing rights some agreement had
to be made immediately. The modus vivendi of 1885 wag renewed
annually until 1S05 when the controversy became so serious that not
only was the Treaty of 1871 renewed but it was also- modified to
specially permit the use of x^urse seines by Americans, and to pro-
hibit American fishing on Sunday. An Act called the Newfoundlands
Foreign Fishing Vessels Act was passed by Newfoundland in 1906, to
restrict American fishing vessel rights. The agreer^ent of 1907 re-
lating to fishing within the three mile limit waived the use of
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purse seinea anl provided for acceptance of light du^^^^hy
A'rerican f iahing vessels ^while Newfoundland agreed to postpone
the carrying into effect of the act of 1<^^^. This a^r^er-ent
?>'as renewed again in IPne.- (29) The importance of the execu-
tive agreement in Canadian affairs can hardly be overeat irated.
The modus vlvendi was used again in the Eehring Sea
Controversy, The United States ^fter a period of vrastefuL hese
of natural resources suddenly decided to protect the fur-"bearing
seals. The United States ,deciding that Behring Sea was 9 mare
clausum^ attempted to prevert all other nations from taking seals
from there. America began seizing British ships that came into
that sea in 1886, The British Government protested on the ground that
all seizures tbok place outside the three mile limit. An Alaskan
Court upheld the seizures under the opinion that Eehring Sea was
closed in the same sense that a harbor is closed. The first request
for cooperation in protecting the fisheries was sent to Japan ^ Great
Britain, and other ITuropean Countries ^without result. Lord Salis-
bury's protest to Secretary Blaine, in 188^, brought the rebuke that
it ";ae no more defensibl? d-^stroy herds of seals outside the three
laile limit than to fish destructively on the banks of Newfoundland
by the explosion of dynamite.
Pending a treaty of arbitration to settle the dispute
between Great Britain and this country
^
temp'^rary agreement was
made in June 1891, limiting the killing of seals. The arbitration
treaty of th^ following year covered substantially the same con-
ditions and continued the terms of this agreement. The arbitration
settlement cost the United States $473,000 ir. damages for the
illegal seizure of British ships. The results cf the protection
0
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under the Treaty of 1892 were not \7holly buccessful. A ccnver.tion
between Great Britain and the United Ttates in 1911 was euper-
S"^d?d "by one in the san-e year by which C-reat Britain, Russia,
Japan, and the United States agreed to prohibit their citizens
from "pelag'ic" sealing ( killing in the open sea ) in the waters
of the North Pacific. In 1912^ our country prohibited its cit-
izens from killing on the Pribilof lels.nds for five ysars. Under
these restrictions the herd increased. In 1925 there were 723,050
seals. (30)
Another agreement between the British Prrpire and the
United Gtates was that which fixed the boundary between Canada and
Alaska in October 1899. This remained in force until the final
treaty of 1903, and made the head of the Lynn Canal the boundary
"without prejudice to the claims of either party in permanent ad-
justment of the boundary." In 1905 an exchange of notes confirmed
the report of the Commissioners who were completing the award under
the convention of January 24,1903; restricting boundary lines.
In 1899; the protection of trade marks In Morocco was
accomplished by exchange of notes between the English speaking
countries, T^'atents in Morocco were protected by a similar agree-
ment in 1906. In 1905. all trade marks in China were to be pro-
tected by the British and American Consular Courts against
infringement by American or -ritish subjects. This, toe, was
accomplished by and exchange of notes.
Exclusive of the Armistice with Germany in 1918, the
final important series o:^ executive agreements with Great Britain
came rith the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Arm-
aments. After havir^g agreed by treaty to limit the numiber of
c
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cruisera to the proportion of 5 - 5 - 3 - ij - i^- betvveen Great
Britain^ United States, Japan, France^ and Italy in the order
nair.edj a aaries of agreerrents were rr.ade which dealt with con-
ditions in China and the Islands of the Pacific Ccean. VTiile
these were not given the status of treaties, each was to have
"the same force and effect as the said treaty to which it is
supplement." (31) These agreements dealt with such subjects as
extraterritoriality in China, foreign postal agencies in China,
withdrawal of armed forces by Japan and other countries, unifi-
cation of railways in China under Chinese rule, reduction of
Chinese military forces, regulation of radio stations and the
prohibitions on messages, the creation of a Board of Reference
for Eastern Questions, and the establishrcent of a Comn-iission
of Jurists to consider amendment of the laws of war.
Many less important agreements have also been made.
The protocol of 1891 between Great Britain, Portugal, and the
United States has already been mentioned in connection with pecun-
iary claims. Under the fi.ct of Congress of March 3,1691, recipro-
cal copyright privileges were extended to Great Britain. Under
the Dingley Tariff '^ct of 1897 duties on certain enumerated '
articles from Great Britain were lowered through an executive pro-
clamation in 1907, In the $in:3 year by exchange of notes certain
American Companies were leased some islands off the ^^orth Bornean
Coast. The lease was to be given by the British North Borneo
Company. The Minutes of Conference^ "'ashin-ton ^ in 1911^ regard-
ing the existing treaties and negotiations over the fisheries were
made official without the " advice and consent of the Senate." A
ye?.r later the rule of procedure for the Torth Atlantic Coast
rI
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Fisheries Arbitration w^rs agroid upon without Seritlte action.
In 1S15, in spite of the fact that extradition has
usually been the rsault of a treaty, an agreement was r.ade with
Great Britain permitting extradition between the Fhilippinea, or
Guam, and British TJorth Borneo. In 1914, an agreer.ent was
reached between the two English speaking nations over the action
which they should take to preserve the status quo with respect to
the protection of oil interests and mining interests in the tur-
bulent country of Mexico,
By 1925, radio broadcasting had become of supreme im-
portance. The demands of listeners could not be disregarded.
Among the chief sources of interference with the broadcasting of
entertainment were the spark coils used by many ships in their
wireless operations. By an agreement made with Great Britain in
1925 such interference was to be eliminated. In 1927^^^roperty^
seized under American and British trading-with-enemy acts^ •'iS
reciprocally made by authority of an executive agreement.
From this brief a'^count of the important agreements
made between the United States and Great Britain, we see nearly
all possible treaty conditions settled permanently or temporarily
by executive agreement. The ceding of Horseshoe Reef, the tempor-
ary fixing of the boundary between Alaska and Canada, the acceptance
of the final survey under treaties of 1S46 and 1903, the long drawn
out modus Vivendi regarding the fisheries on the North Atl?-ntic
Coast, the protection from, seal destruction,' the trademark and
patent agreements in Morocco and China, and the clearing up of
' war clouds in the Pacific by the agreements of the Washington Con-
'ference^all testify to the importance of the executive agreement in
international affairs.
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Jjixecutive Agreements of great importpnce
A. Agreements in oaribbean Ke^xoii
1. raymenj. oi oreaixor nations oy t>anto uomingo
I'ernapb tae greatest aepar^ure irom tae orcaL^ -iufa.ji.xug re-
quireiuenwo "WOOK ^^xace wnen Pi.ebAaent Roosevelt me.de his agreejiient v/ith
Santo Doiain£;o , The history of Santo Domingo with its mulatto popula-
tion hE.s been one of continuous re'volution. In 1869, plans for annex-
ing the Boirdnican Republic to the United States had failed. In 188^:: a
man, tJlises Heureaux came into control. During the next seventeen
years of peace under despotism, he increased the debt of his extrava-
gant predecessors to $£0,000,000. The show of prosperity cad been a
sham bought by the sale of concessions and foreign loans. There were
but ten miles of roadway in the Republic. Industr^' except in the sea-
ports was almost a nonentity. The period 1899-1904 , following t'/]^.
essf sina tion^^brought the debt to $3£,,000,000 and the country was now
unable to pay even the interest on the debt. The greater proportion of
the claims of all countries were highly speculative in character, and
often tinged with fraud and corruption, Itany of these claims^ li^.e tnat
of the Santo Domingo Improvement Claim^werc settled by protofOi^but the
promised payments were not made, 3 2^
In 1905, President Morales, feeling the pressure exerted by for-
eign powers, appealed to the United States to shiela his country from
interference by the Italians and French jwhosc vessels were reported on
the way to the island for the purpose of landing marines who shoula en-
force payment. Several reasons made the United States disposed to
help the Republic. We were interested to some extent in the humanitar-
ian motive for helping a weaker people, we feared that the diseases due
to unsanitary conditions there would spread to the United States, to
t I
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foreign countries, and to Cuba and Porto Rico; vt had extensive inter-
ests in the island, itself; and most important of nil we were opposed
to any other country landing and controlling the customs and ports of
any territory in the New World, fearing that it would bring about an-
nexation which was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine.
President Roosevelt sent Comma.nder Dillingham, a naval officer
with a wide knowledge of conditions in San Domingo, to assist the Amer-
ican Minister, L.C. Dawson in arranging a plan of payment. It was re-
cognized that the Republic should not pay all the claims which had been
made as many of them were fraudulent. On January 20, 1905, six days
after Dillingham* s arrival the Dillingham-Sanchez Protocol was signed.
Although it guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Dominican Re-
public, it provided for the control of the Dominican custom houses.
Forty-five percent of the customs revenue was to be turned over to the
Dominican government and the balance to be used b^. the United States to
pay the creditor nations. The compromises and notes which followed
delayed the completion of the protocol until February 7. Popular r.ds-
tility to Americans, fear of annexation, and suspicion of the designs
of the United States proved difficult obstacles for the Dominican min-
istry to surmount. However, American warships supplementing American
tact made it possible to submit the document to the Senate on February
15, 1905. Senate opposition developed immediately. Neither that
session nor a special session of Congress following, could secure ac-
tion on the protocol. The Democrats and a few absent Republicans pre-
vented its passage. The rumor that the Dillingham-Sanchez protocol
was to be made a treaty without Senatorial action raised a storn of pro-
test. In spite of President Roosevelt disclaiming any such intention,
the rumor had raised the broad question as to the President s power to
r
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enter into international agreements of any kind without tne advice and
consent of the Senate.
The protccsl with Santo Domingo failed to secure Senate Approval,
rumors of revolution spread through the Capital of Santo Domingo. The
arrival of an Italian cruiser on March 14, 1905 increased the confusion.
The other creditor nations began exerting pressure for resumption of
payments under their existing protocols. The Dominican Minister of Fi-
nance threatened to resign unless some practical "modus vtvendi" was
adopted pending the ratification of the treaty. Dawson, cabled to V/asn-
inton that an arrangement by which an American citizen should act as
receiver of customs would be satisfactory to the creditor states and
would prevent intervention.
President Roosevelt finally accepted the "modus Vivendi". By its
terms, the President of the United States would suggest nominations of
American citizens for the position of rf'*ei"vers of customs in the vari-
ous ports. The Dominican President would make the final caoice. Forty
five per cent of the money collected would be turned over to the Domin-
ican government and the remainder be deposited in a New York bank des-
ignated by the President of the United States; there to be kept until
the gefiate acted upon the treaty. If the Senate action were adverse,
the money could be turned over to the Dominican government; if its ac-
tion were favorable, the money would be distributed to Santo Domingo's
creditors. Colonel George R, Colton, a former customs collector of the
Philippines, was nominated by Roosevelt as general receiver and collect-
or. President Morales appointed him.
Although Roosevelt had accepted the "modus t^*vendi" after a con-
ference with leading senators, he expected Se nate opposition. In a
confidential letter to Hay, he thus described ais action; "There nas
It
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been a rather comic development in the Santo Domingo case. Morales
asked us to take over the custom-houses pending action by the Senate.
I decided to do so but first of all consulted Spooner, Foraker, Lodge,
and Knox. All heartily agreed that it was necessary for me to take
this action. Rather to my horror, Taft genially chaffed them about
going back on their principles as to the usurpation of the executive.
But they evidently took the view that it was not the time to be over-
particular about trifles, I also consulted Gorman, who told me that
he had taken it for granted tnat I would have to take some such action
as that proposed, and believed it necessary, I understand, however,
that this was merely his unofficial opinion, and that officially he is
going to condemn our action as realizing his worst forebodings'*.
Senator Morgan of Alabama lead the opposition, by denouncing the
President's action as unconstitutional, because he nad executed a
treaty whicn the Se nate had failed to approve, and nad established a
protectorate over the island. It was declared that only warships were
able to maintain the "modus Vivendi". Certain, it is, that the pres-
ence of American warships effectually discouraged the insurrections
which in the past had made a stable Dominican government impossible, an
incipient revolution appearing in that country causea Roosevelt to write
to the Secretary of the Navy declaring that the island must be kept in
3'/
"status quo" until the Senate has acted upon the treaty. The note was
interpreted by the Senate as meaning that a protectorate was contempla-
ted by the President, Secretary Root who became the successor to John
Hay brought about a slight change in Roosevelt's policy of interference
with revolutions.^' The discord resulted in armed conflict between the
followers of Morales and those of Vice-President Caceres who finally
triumphed. The United States, outside of protecting the custom-houses,

did not give any apparent assistance to either party during the revolu-
tion.
Meanwhile, the struggle in the Senate continued tlXuerl^, Tne
arrangement of February 7, 1905^which in its essential points was put
into effect by the "modus Vivendi" was so severely attacked tnat nego-
tiations were reopened for alterations. The amended protoc(?i was ap-
proved by the Se nate on February 25, 1907. The good results brought
about by the agreement had influenced public approval of the treaty in
spite of the Senate. Three important political features of the earlier
protocol had been omitted from the ratified treaty but Roosevelt insist-
ed that these changes were utterly unimpui tant" . One reason for the
continuation of the straggle between the President and the Senate was
the previous lack of popular interest in Dominican affairs.
The justification for the President's action lies in the econom-
ic results of the "modus vivendi" rather than in the legal background
which might support his action, Roosevelt cared little for precedent
or for Constitutional sanction^ if consequences of his action seemed wor-
thy. The Senate was rather inclined to resent the power of the execu-
tive, but did not present sound evidence that the President was exceed-
ing his legal rigats. Certainly^ they did not present any substitute for
the President's action. Colonel Golton declared that in a little more
than two years, Santo Domingo had been transformed from a bankrupt State-
without credit at home or abroad, consumed by revolutions within, and
threatened by creditors without— into a solvent and peaceful country of
37
some dignity and promise and Roosevelt felt that he nad put the afiairs
of the island on a better basis than they had been for a century. The
total cash on hand for distribution to the creaitor nations at the
termination of the agreement amounted to $3,<;£3,986.02 (July 31, 1907)
In addition ^the Dominican government had been able to meet its current
expenses out of the 45^ of the receipts allotted to it.
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That government received as its sinare a larger amount in cash than
when it had received their entire income. Besides, the government oad
acquired four new steel cutters for revenue service, had established
an effective patrol service on the frontier, had openea new schools,
improved roads, and repaired public buildings. The professional revo-
lutionists seemed the only group in Santo Domingo to disapprove the
"modus Vivendi".
Roosevelts policy had a far reaching effect on the later collec-
tion of debts for foreign countries. Secretary Knox, in Taft's admin-
istration, negotiated treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras by which
the United States was to assure financial supervision. In both instan-
ceSj provision was me.de for tae appointment of collectors of customs who
had been approved by President Taft, In tne case of Nicaragua,
President Taft appointed a collector immediately , without waiting for
Senate approval and loans by New York bankers were made. Later^ the
Senate rejected these treaties and political and financial uphevals
followed which necessitated the stationing of a warsnip and marines at
Corinto. President Wilson also modeled his action on that of Roose-
velt in Santo Domingo by approving a treaty authorizing a receivership
of customs in Haiti, The manner in which Americans managed Haitian
affairs, however, has brought about much criticism. Tne Presidents
seem to decide upon either treaty or modus Vivendi on tne attitude of
the Senate it self ^ without regard to the legal justification for eitner
executive agreement or treaty. Taking all things into consideration,
"the Roosevelt policy and action in regard to the collection of debts
involving nations has been promotive of international amity and peace," J?^
2. Nicaraguan Agreement
The events leading up to the agreement witn Nicaragua were
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peculiar in many ways to all Central American countries. Nicaragua,
largest of the five Central American States, nas received more atten-
tion from foreign powers than any otner owing to its canal possibilities.
Its political history has "been one of continual uproar and revolution,
next to HoT^duras, it is the most "backward state in Central America. Its
policies have several times prevented tne union of the Central American
Countries. Education and transportation have been almost neglecLed,
In July 1906 1 war broke out between Guatemala and Salvador. Hon-
duras was drawn in on tne side of Salvador. President Roosevelt ^with
the co-operation of President Diaz of Mexico, urged, through notes, the
cessation of nostilities. The American warship "Marblehead** was sugges-
ted as a neutral ground for making a peaceful agreement. The conven-
tion of peace was signed and provision made that new difterences should
be submitted to arbitration with the presidents of Mexico and the United
States as arbitrators.^^ The subsequent treaty at Costa Rica was partici-
pated in by all but Nicaragua. President Ze/aya of Nicaragua was nostile
to the United States and hence was unwilling to accept the President as
arbitrator.
Hond^as and Nicaragua started a dispute over tne right of Honduras
to pursue revolutionists across the Nicaraguan border. Obligatory arbi-
tration was suggested, A joint conference at Washington November 14,
1907 started with apparent harmony. A scheme for the union of tne five
republics ,which was proposed by HonduraSjmet with a divergence of opin-
ion. Finally a general treaty of peace and amity was signed which was
to remain in force for ten years. This same conference established the
Central American Court of Justice for aecifrfing all future disputes.
The Court of Justice was the first of its kind in the world. The Hague
< t (
#64
had tried in vain to establiaii such a court for settling European and
American disputes.
Meanwhile President Zelaya continued to show nis antagonism to-
ward the United States, When a new revolution broke out in Nicaragua,
the United States remained neutral until the brutal execution of two
Americans by Zelaya brought about the termination of diplomatic relations^
The attitude of America brought the downfall of President Zelaya, His
successor, President Madriz, was defeated by Senor Don Juan Estrada who
gained possession of Nicaragua by August 1910, Promises were made by
the new government that a general election would be neld and that the
national finances would be rehabilitated , if a loan were made by the Am-
erican government, Mr, Dawson was dispatched as a special agent to aeal
with this provisional government. Several agreements were entered into.
Estrada was to remain for two years at the head of the government.
Afterwards, a free election would be held. A claims Commission consist-
ing of one Nicaraguan, one American^ and an umpire named by the American
State Department was to consider all unliquidated claims against the
republic and a loan secured by the custom's receipts, was to be raised
in the United States. The success of these arrangements was tnwarted
by the failure of the Senate to accept the special loan Convention which
had been made. It had been put in operation before being sent to the
Senate however, and was working successfully until the Senate definitely
rejected it. Had the Senate allowed the President a continued free sway
in Nicaragua, the problem could easily have been cleared up. As a re-
sult of the rejection of the convention, American bankers refused to
continue their loans. A new President, General Diaz, favored outside
support and secretly suggested that the Nicaraguan constitution might
be amended to permit the United States to intervene in its internal
/
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affairs for the purpose of maintaining peace and a lawful government.
A new revolution in 1912 made the protection of American lives and prop-
erty inperative and President Taft landed a small detacnment of marines
at Nicaragua the Capitol city. The marines took an active part in the
revolution on the side of the Diaz government and peace was restored.
President Taft had dropped all efforts to carry out the financial ar-
rangement after the Senate had refused to accept the treaty. The finan-
cial situation was therefore deplorable. As a solution, Nicaragua pro-
posed to sell to the Unitea States for $3,000,000 the sole right to
construct a canal through her territory and to construct a naval base
in the Gulf of Fonseca and one on Corn Island, An^ttempt by President
Wilsor , to establish an almost complete protectorate by treaty over
Nicaragua was frustrated by the Senate, The treaty proclaimed June £4,
1916 secured the right of building the canal, and establisaing naval
bases, Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras complained that tneir exist-
ing treaty rights were being violated b^ this treaty, )^hen they tried
to secure their rights by appealing to the Central American Court of
Justice, that Court declared that Nicaragua had violated her treaty with
Costa Rica but that it refused to annul the ca'f^l treaty because tne
United States did not come under the jurisdiction of the court. ThJts
the United States, by its action, brought about the downfall of the
very court it 'nad so auspiciously sponsored in the convention at Wash-
ington. This brought a great deal of suspicion and hatred of the United
States. The avowed policy of the United States to bring closer relation-
ships between the Central American countries was defeated bj the selfish
interests of the United States itself. Had the agreement made by Presi-
dent Taft been allowed to continue ^a great many of the disasterous con-
sequences of revolution in Nicaragua might have been avoided. Tne treaty
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which resulted in the downfall of tne Central American Court v/ould
have been unnecessary and America's presti£e and reputation for dis-
interested aid in Central American affairs might not nave been cnal-
lenged. The Senate Irias been actuated more by fear of presidential
domination than by consideration of the interests of Nicaragua,
The lack of a continuous policy in Central America has illus-
trated the fundamental weakness of the requirement of consent of the
Senate in treaty making. The attitude of America has been undoubtedly
misunderstood by Latin America but the record of the American Senate
has had much effect in creating this misunderstanding,
Kow far trie Senate had gone in reference to protectorates in the
Caribbean was shown by the prompt ratification of the treaty of estab-
lishing a protectorate over Haiti in 1915, Li^e the arrangements made
with San Domingo and Nicaragua, a receivership of customs was provided
with an American financial adviser. In addition the native constabu-
lary was to be commanded by American officers; tbe expenditures of
public moneys were to be managed b^ the United States, no territory
ceded
was to be eeBaaaH§Le4 by to any nation by Haiti; revolutionary forces were
to be disarmed and the convention was to be renewable if necessary, V/
In 1917, an executive agreement extended the treaty of September 16, 191
for twenty years to protect a loan made by the United States, A claims
commission under the treaty of September 16, 1915 was established by
executive agreement in 1919 and modified in 19kk. by exchange of notes.
The executive in the last three decades has assumed an increasingly
strong hold over Car ibbean affairs without considering Senate "adviCe
and consent," .
3, The weakness of the executive agreement that it is extra-
legal and hence not the "supreme law of the land" in the meaning of the
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Constitution. The Taft agreements of 1904-1911 served as a "modus
operandi* during the period of construction of the Panama Canal. Tney
include such suhjects as the establishment of Courts in tne Canal Zone,
^ sanitary regulations, use of ports of Cristobal and Avion and duties.
These were confirmed by the Panama Canal act of August k4, 19i;c as
"valid and binding until Congress should otherwise provide".
In a letter of September 1, 19^2 to President Harding, Acting
Secretary of State, Phillips ,said "The Taft agreement was intended as a
temporary arrangement to cover the period of construction of the Canal.
As such it has served its purpose, since the canal has for some time
been formally open to commerce. It no longer provides an adequate basis
for the adjustment of questions arising out of the relations between the
Canal Zone authorities and the Government of Panama and it is the opin-
ion of this department, and, I am informed of tne War Department also
that the agreement should be replaced in the near future bj, a more per-
manent arrangement. The secretary also recommended that Congress be re-
quested to abrogate the existing Taft agreement and so to make wa^ for
negotiating a new treaty. The President sent the note to Congress re-
questing that the time of abrogation should be left to the President
in order to allow time for negotiatiy>j a new treaty. By the acknow-
ledgement cf the President an agreement cannot be enforcea to the extent
of a treaty and therefore less satisfactory when a treaty is possible,
V. B. Agreements in the Pacific
1. Protocol between the United States and Foreign Powers
at Pekin.
Since the year 1899, when the acquisition of the Phii i-
^ines and of Porto Rico made the United States an imperialistic nation,
this country has taken an active interests in the problems of China and
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the islands of the Pacific Ocean. Mathew C. Perry in 1853, succeeded
in breaking down the Japanese policy of isolation. Tne treaty of 1854
permitted American ships to obtain coal and supplies and oegan tne Qev-
elcpment of the Japanese Empire, In 1858 a treaty with Cnina made pos-
sible the .work ofi^oreign missionaries in that country.
The latter part of the Nineteenth Century saw Japan inflict a de-
cisive defeat upon China. Japan seized Formosa and Korea as the rewards
of victory. The jealousy of foreign powers prevented further inroads
into China after the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1905. Not to be out-
done by Japan, Germany gained a concession at Kiao-Chau, Russia secured
a lease of Port Arthur, Great Britain secured rignts in Weinaiwei', and
France secured its portion in Kwangchaouwan. In each case, the lease
included a large area surrounding the city as a "sphere of influence"
to be economically controlled by the nation holding the lease. Tiae
partition of China seemed imminent and the trade of tne United States
was threatened.
On October 1, 1898, foreign affairs were put in the skil ful hands
of John Hay, a man who possessed an intimate knowledge of European con-
ditions. The principle of the "open door" or equal opportunities in
commerce and trade was inagurated in the newly acquired Philippines,
The United States held no "sphere of influence" in China and had much
to gain through the extension of the "open door" policy to China. In
September, 1899, John Hay addressed a circular letter to Great Britain,
Russia, Japan, Germany, France, and Italy asking for formal assurance
that "sphere of influence" did not mean to interfere with any treaty port
or vested interest, or with the Chinese tariff which should apply equally
to all goods shipped into the spheres and be collected by Chinese offi-
cials, or with railroad rates or harbor dues which should be equal to
the rates charged to the country's own citizens. ^1
I
Great Britain was the only nation willing to comply fully witii
the open door principle^ the other nations hedgint, ^didi not dsn to
openly oppose the measure. They would agree to the proposal "in prin-
ciple" if all other nations would agree without qualifications. The
answers were unsatisfactory, "but John Hay aetermined upon a bob letter
definitely committing all the powers to the principle by saying that
since all had acceded to his propositions, the United States considered
their consent as "final and definite". This retaraed the economic pen-
etration of China,
The internal affairs of China, were meanwhile ready to boil over.
Reforms by the Emperor had failed to accomplish anything. A general
anti-foreign movement culminated in tne Boxer Rebellion. The govern-
ment of China sympathized with the Boxers rather than with the foreign-
ers. All foreigners were ordered to leave Pekin and the German ambas-
sador was shot while attempting to visit the authorities to protest a-
gainst the order. The British legation to which all foreigners had
fled was surrounded and beslg^ged. The United States took a prominent
part in the relief of the besieged legationers and was in a strong pos-
ition for control ing the terms of peace.
The uprising threatened to undermine all of the work accomplished
in behalf of the "open door". Altriough the relief of the foreigners did
not take place until August 14, 1900, John Kay on July 5rd had announced
by circular telegram that the United States would seek to bring about
permanent safety and peace to China, preserve the territorial integrity
of the country and insure equal opportunities to all nations in the
commerce of China. It had been quite evident that most of the powers
wanted revenge and further concessions in China, The policy of the
United States was the sole obstacle. Had John Kay waited for the "^d
( 1
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vice and consent of tae Senate" a separate treaty detrimental to China
might have been made.
The protocol "between China and the Allied Powers was signed at
Pekin on September 7, 1901. It did not receive the formal two-tairds
vote of the Senate^and hence is numbered among tne agreements which are
most like the formal treaties of major importance. Tne nations signing
the protocol included Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and tne United
States. On the part of the United States, the protocol was signed by
W.W.Rockhill , a special commissioner ^who had been appointed by President
McKinley without the "advice and consent" of the Senate. This protocol
included such treaty subjects as reparation for the murder of tne German
minister, the punishment of tae principle autnors of tne outrages com-
mitted against foreigners, prohibition on the importation of arms and
ammunition by China, payment to all the Allies of an indemnity totaling
about $333,000,000, the occupation of Chinese territory, and the protec-
tion of lines of communication with Pekin through temporary occupation
of certain points along the railroad between Pekin and tne sea, and the
transforming of China's foreign office into a ministry of foreign affairs
which should be superior to the six ministers of state.
During the advance upon Pekin and the subsequent negotiations^ the
powers ratrier grudgingly acce led again to the principle of the open
door. As a result of the unselfish attitude snown b^- the United States,
the friendship of China was secured. The American share of tae indem-
nity amounting to $24,000,000 was found to be more than enough to satisfy
all claims. The gratitude of China was increased by the voluntary giving
up of about $12,000,000 in claims. Tnis amount was set aside bv tae
Chinese government to be used as a fund for the education of Chinese
students in the United States. The United States had secured the integ-
I I <
rity of China and the certainty that China's affairs shoula be largely
under her own control. Though the agreement lacked the binding force of
a treaty, it was accepted without question by the powers concerned.
2, 1907-1908 Root«Takahira Agreement
The traditionally friendly relations between Japan and the
United States began to show marks of friction in the early years ol tne
Twentieth Century, The Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia
terminated the Russo-Japanese War but failed to give Japan tne neavy in-
demnity that she wanted. The influence of tne United States was blamed
for this. Moreover, California was seriously objecting to tne presence
of Japanese in the state. Japanese children were segregated in separate
schools by the San Francisco board of Education.
Japan which had but recently contributed to the San Francisco earthquake
relief fund was indignant. A treaty excluding Japanese was attempted
but Japan refused to agree. The President made a concession to nation-
alistic feeling by resorting to an agreement negotiated by Secretary
Root and Baron fakahira, the Japanese ambassador. The understanding was
that the Japanese government would prevent the i2:i.igration of laborers to
the United States. The increased demand for furiaer restriction of im-
migration after the war resulted in a clause inserted into the ijuraigra-
tion quota law of 1924 which virtually abrogated the "Gentlemen's Agree-
ment" of 1907 by refusing admission to aliens not allowed to become cit-
izens. The result could have been accomplished more tactfully by contin-
uing the "Gentlemen's Agreement" but in spite of the urging made by Sec-
retary Hughes and President Coolidge, Congress was bent upon curtailing
the power of the President over foreign affairs, A treaty with Japan
accomplishing this result would again nave been impossible.
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The Root-Takahira understanding of 1907 was extended in 1906 by
exchange of notes to include a statement of the attitude of the two
nations in regard to China. Peaceful development of commerce in tae
Pacific Ocean, the maintainance of the "status quo" and the principle
of equal opportunity for commerce and industry in Cnina, and the pre-
servation of the common interests of all nations were affirmed. To
keep the "status quo" or the principle of equal opportunity, the gov-
ernments were "to communicate with each other to arrive at an under-
standing as to what measures they would consider useful to take" should
any disturbing event arise. The words "existing status quo" were not
defined and might have been interpreted as meaning acceptance by the
United States of claims of right implicit in the acts of Japan in Man-
churia since the Portsmouth Treaty, ^8
3, The Lansing-Ishii Agreement
In 1915, Japan made her famous twenty-one demands upon China
which showed that she had not given up hope of securing special rights
and concessions in China, In 1917 without implying an abrogation of the
Root-Takahira understanding of 1918, Secretary Lansing and Viscount
Ishii of Japan exchanged notes with the ostensible purpose to silence
mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated. In tne
agreement, the two powers recognized that "territorial propinquity cre-
ates special relations between countries and, consequently, the Govern-
ment of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests
in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contig-
uous."
"The territorial sovereignty of China nevertheless remains unim-
paired," The "open door" was reaffirmed, and both parties denied that
they "purposed to infringe" in any way with the independence of China
II
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or to discriminate against the commerce of other nations or the treaty
rights of other nations,"
The territorial concessions to Japan already forced from Cnina
were threatening the independence of China and it is difficult to see
how the recognition of "special rights" in China was to harmonize witn
America's stand against spheres of influence in the two preceeding dec-
ades. The agreement though relating to China was negotiated witnout
the knowledge of the Chinese foreign Office. The Cninese Government
felt humiliated, and feared the possitle effect of this recognition of
special interests "by America. The agreement in violation of the under-
standing with the United States, was first communicate ad to the Chinese
Government through the Japanese Legation on November 4, 1917. Secre-
tary Lansing claimed that the agreement "did not directly affect any
rights of China except that the two countries agreed that they would
keep their hands offf^ Mr. Lansing also stressed the fact that Japan
had promised to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
China and to observe the principle of the "open door" and mii|Laized the
recognition by the United States of any "special interests" m China,
The need of an agreement in 1917 is still a mystery according
to W.W, Willoughfcy. > Secretary of State Lansing said that the principle
reason for the agreement was to get a renewed declaration upon the
part of Japan in favor of the open door in China. Wnen asked b^ the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate if tne agree-
ment operated to endorse Japan *s Twenty-One demands the Secretary replied
"Absolutely not^. We were opposed to the Twenty-one Demands. However
Secretary Lansing admitted that Viscount Ishii instead of eccepting
Lansing's view as to the meaning of "special interest" had maintained
silence. In regard to the question by Senator Brandegee whether the so-
called Lansing-Ishii Agreement had any binding force upon this country
I
Secretary I^ansing answered "no" and went on to explain that the agree-
ment was simply a declaration of the policy of the government as long
as the President or the State Department wanted to continue that pol-
icy just as the Root-Takahira agreement is. The difficulty which this
agreement involved was thet the various powers could not agree as to
the meaning of "special interests". The terns were not clearly defined
and might be taken in a sense not anticipated b^ the American Govern-
ment as meaning that v/e recognized all the agressions made by Japan to
be in pursuance of her rights and interests by reason of her proximity.
The northern boundary of KoreX is continuous with Cnina and gives to
Japan a reel concern in whet happens to China. This is true even in
political matters and in commerce with China which is especially impor-
tant to the Chinese, Should any other power get a comiiianding control
over China, Japan's safety would be threatened. On the other nand
special interests can not mean that Japan has the right to infringe up-
on territorial rights of China. It is possible that the agreement was
made without sufficient deliberation and the Constitutional requirement
of "advice and consent of the Senate" if applied to this agreement mignt
have prevented the agreement from going into effect. As nas been shown
the agreement is not considered as binding as a treaty but it is still
a means of arriving at international settlements of great significance
and may be abused to the e: trent of committing this country to ill ad-
vised arrangements. Had the President attempted to secure Senate ac-
tion on the settlement of the Boxer uprising, the resulting delay might
have resulted in the other powers negotiating a separate peace which
would have denied the principle of the "open door* and have secured
"concessions" detrimental to American and Chinese interests. On the
other hand, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement accomplished little and was
t(
nearly equivalent to a denial of all previous policies trward "epneres
of influence*. Whether or not the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was advisaDle
in the light of Japanese penetration into Manchuria, tne Agreement w-as
terminated by exchange of notes between Hughes and Hancnara of Japan in
1923.
V, C. (1) The Armistice --Protocgl with Spain 1696
A type of agreement commonly used to terminate war is the armis-
tice preceding a treaty. Included in the armistice are many agreements
which noriiially would be part of a formal treaty. The arrangement is
temporary but the terms of the armistice may go into effect before a for-
mal treaty of peace is made. The need for immeciiate action in termina-
ting a war would be urged for the continued use of the armistice and the
extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-cnief of the army
and navy during war time prevents excessive criticism of the President's
action in making a protocol of armistice without the advice and consent
of the Senate.
The last two important armistices to which the United States be-
came a party were the protocals with Spain in 1896, and with Germany and
Austria in 1918.
The War with Spain was ending in disaster for the Spanish Govern-
ment, when on Jixly 16, 1698, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio, the Spanisn
minister of state requested the French government to allow M. Cambon,
the French ambassador at Washington to present a communication leading
toward peace. The letter presented on July 22nd was far from admitting
that the Spanish were defeated. The reply of the United States however
was for definite relincj^aishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty
over Cuba, the cessicr. of Porto Rico and the other Spanish West Indies
Islands and an island of the Ladrones to the United States, and to allow
\i
i
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the United States to occupy the city, bay, and harbor of Manil af Tae
attempt of Spain to modify the understanding of President McKmley's
terms, almost led to the breaking off of peace negotiations. However,
a draft of a protocol was drawn up which embodied the American demands.
J On August 12, 1898 the protocol was signed and hostilities were ordered
suspended, Manil a due to its distance and lack of cabal facilities
did not receive news of the armistice until the afternoon of August 16
and in the meantime had been actually occupied by American troops.
President Mc Kinley in offering to draw up a protocol expressed to M.
Cambon the opinion that that preliminary document would have no purpose
or effect other than to consecrate without delay tne understanding of
the two governments for the commencement of peace and that therefore^ it
would not be necessary to receive in it either the rights of the Spanisn
Cortes, or those of the Federal Senate, which would be required in a
formal treaty. .5"
3
In the protocdl^ a general armistice was provided, (1) Spain was
to' relin<j iish all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba; (2) Spain
was to cede to the United States the islands under Spanish control in
the West Indies, the island of the Ladrones, and Porto Rico; (3) Tne
United States was to occupy Manila pending the treaty which should de-
termine the control of tae PnijcppinesJ (4) Spain was to imjiediately eva-
cuate Cuba, Porto Rico and the islands of the Spanish West Indies under
the direction of a Spanish and an American commission", (5) Spain and the
United States were each to appoint five commissioners to meet not later
than October to conclude a treaty of peace.
All evacuations took place prior to the treaty of Peace of Dec. 10
1898. Although Congress had previously passed an act declaring Cuba
should be granted its independence, no authority was implied by the act
rc
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for taking over Porto Rico and Guam. The action of trie President de-
termined in no small degree the terms of the final treaty. The ques-
tion oi tdhat v/e should do with the Phili^ir es was the only perplex-
ing proLlem^as "".hftSpanish negotiators were v.illing to concede all other
points. Progressively the demands of President Mc Kinley grew to in-
clude first the island of Luzon and finally the entire PnilL(>pine ar-
chipelago. The United States began to take up "tne white ma.n»s burden.*
The treaty of peace as would be expected would never be put into
effect without Senate acceptance. The Senate debatec the treaty for
more than a month. On February 6, 1699 the narrowest possible margin
of 57 to 27 ratified the treaty after Kr. Bryan, the leader of the Dem-
ocratic party pCrsuadec the Democratic senators to ratify the peace
treaty now end to leave the dispos^icn of the Philippines to the presi-
dential campaign of the next year. Final ratification took place on
April II exactly one year from President Mc Kinley's war message to
Congress. The requirement of a two-thirds vote of the Senate for mak-
ing a treaty had again nearly wrecked all peace negotiations,
V. C (2) 1916 Armistice with Germany
The World War terminated in a preliminary armistice also. We
entered the war on April 6, 1917 with nigh ideals of "making the world
safe for democracy." No war in history coula compare with this war in
methods of warfare, size of armies, or in casualties, A delay of a few
hours in stopping the war v/ould have increased the cost b^- millions and
the number of killed by thousands.
On January 8, 1918, President Wilson transmitted his "fourteen
points" to Congress stating that he believed them to be the only pos-
sible program for the world's peace. ^"^Open diplomacy, freedom of the
seas, removal of international barriers, reduction of armaments,
ad-
rr
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justment of colonial claims, territorial and political problems of
Russia, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, Italy, the Balican States, Turkey,
and Poland, and last and most important the formation of an association
of nations for mutually |^aaranteeing peace and territorial integrity
were considered in these fourteen points.
President Wilson's fourteen points met with little interest on
the part of the German militarists. A great drive was being launched
which was predicted by the Germans as being poweriul enough to win the
war. The German offensive failed ^however, and during the late summer
and autumn, a counter offensive steadily drove the Geriaa.n forces back-
ward. Anarchy broke out in Germany, Fresh troops were ariving in
France from America daily in increasing numbers. Peace was necessary
if the Fatherland was to be saved from absolute ruin. On October 4,
Chancellor Max through the Swiss minister at Wasnington sought peace
on the basis of the fourteen points. President Wilson neither refused
or complied with the request for an armistice but insisted that peace
was impossible as long as the military masters and monarcnical autocrats
remained in control of German affairs. The German foreign office pro-
tested that the government had been reorganized and was in complete ac-
cord with the wishes of the people. General Ludendorff resigned from
his comme,nd the latter part of October, and the Reichstag submitted the
military power to civil authorities. Satisfied witn the new German
government. President Wilson submitted the correspondence to the allied
governments suggesting that an armistice might be effected. On November
1 the supreme War Council of the AlUes at Versailles,
with Colonel
nLse as president Wilson-s
representative, .et and pre^red
the ter.s
of an armistice.
^^^^
3^„,,,
President Wilson showec
himseii
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his confidence either in the appointment of his commissioners or in
the decision regarding the right of armistice. The Senate hoi^ever
took upon itself a critical attitude toward the proposed armistice.
Senators Lodge, Hitchcock, and PoWexter were outspoken in their de-
nunciation of anv armistice so soon. Their demands for unconditional
surrender and for retribution to be inflicted upon Germany were so
strong that a concurrent resolution was adopted demanding that:
(l) there should be no cessation of hostilities or armistice without
disbanding of armies and surrender of arms and the Gernaan navy to the
United States as the nation best fitted to receive them, (2) the prin-
ciple of arbitration was to be accepted by Germany; (3) 511 destroyed
property was to be rebuilt at the cost of Germany; (4) Alsace and Lor-
raine which had been wrested from rrance in 1870 was to be returned to
France; (5) and the "fourteen points" of President Wilson were to be
accepted in good faith. The Senate nevertneless^ recognized its weak-
ness to act in the case of enacting an armistice and had little effect
upon the President's policy, SS
On November 8, Marshal Foch read the terms of the armistice, that
had been completed by November 4, to the German delegates. The terms
of the treaty were to be signed by the German delegates within Seventy-
two hours. The threat of revolution in Germany made the signing of the
armistice imperative and it went into effect at 11 A.M. of November 11,
1918.
The terms of the armistice were drastic but might have been made
more intolerable had the war continued a short time longer. The pro-
visions of the armistice required the cessation of all hostilities on
land and sea for 36 days. There was to be an immediate evacuation
without destruction of villages or property of all invaded countries.
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The inhabitants and prisoners of war were to he repatriated by Germany,
German war equipment submarines, and warships were to be surrendered.
The treaties of Brest-Li tc v^k and Bucharest were to be renounced, Tne
part of Germany which is on the left bank of the Rhine was to be occu-
pied by the Allies together with the bridgeheads at Mainz, Coblenz, and
Cologne. The territory on the east bank of the river within a radius
of 30 kilometers was to be occupied by the allied troops as a pledge of
the good intentions of the German Government,
This armistice was renewed every 36 days until the signing of
the peace protocol and the League of Nations Treaty of June £8, 1919,
The terms of the armistice were not fully carried out and there was
constant friction.
The story of the failure of the United States to enter the League
of Nations is too well known to require repetition here. President
Wilson^ though succeeding in bringing about an armistice without consult-
ing the Senate ^was obliged to submit the League of Nations to the Senate
for a two -thirds vote. The Senate after much wrangling consented to
vote for the League with reservations restricting article X of the cov-
enant and interposing safeguards to the Monroe Doctrine, President
Wilson totally disregarded the Senate throughout the negotiation in spite
of the fact that he had promised when leaving for Europe that he would
remain in constant touch with the officials in America by wireless and
cable. The jealousies and desire for revenge of the European nations
made President Wilson's project almost impossible. Compromise overthrew
many of the cherished ideals of the President, To secure the adoption
of the League of Nations, President Wilson gave up his desire for open
discussions, and many of the demands of sms-11 nations ^believing that the
League wa& the only means of removing for all time the curse of war.
f
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The No-vember election of 1918 saw tkie Republicans gain control
in both branches of the sixty-sixth Congress. President Wilson lacked
his country's endorsement but acted as though his popular backing was
as great as that which had been recently accordea to Clemenceau and
^ Lloyd George. In full session of the peace Conference on January 25th
President Wilson stated the mission of the American delegates, saying,
"If we return to the United States without having made every effort in
our power to realize this program (the League of Nations as the keynote
of the treaty), we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow
citizens, For they are a body that constitute a great democracy. They
expect their leaders to speak, their representatives to be their servants
We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But is with the greatest
enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate We would not
dare abate a single item of the program which constitutes our instruc-
ions. Few Europeans could believe that the President was not supported
by the majority of the people at home. To them it was almost unbeliev-
able that a body like the Senate should, after negotiations were comple-
ted, have a final decision as to whether the protocol should be accepted,
amended or rejected. Thirty-seven Republican Senators, four more than
enough to defeat the League Covenant signed a round robin declaring they
would not vote for the treaty if it contained the covenant as it was al-
ready drawn. President Wilson after a brief visit to the United States,
returned to Europe to finish the arrangements. When the peace treaty
was finally signed, the Senate opposition had grown to alarming proper-
) # tions. They felt the total disregard which the President had for them.
The insistence that ratification should take place without amendment
brought the downfall of the American participation in the League of Na-
tions.
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The treatmont of the L^a.^^i} of Nations 5;ood or bad as
it may have been, showed the inherent weakness of a duel ratifying
authority in the case of the treaty. The requirement of a two-
third vote quite frequently results in petty partizanship defeat-
ing the treaty. The only escape from this has been the ability of
the President to make executive agreement in temporary or extra-
ordinary situations whic^ '-/iv arise. The beat remedy v/oald bo to
amend the Constitution to^a simple majority vote.
The armistice convention .with Austria though preCo ding
that V7ith Germany received less prominence. Its form was i^.uch like
the one '^ith Germany. It contained many provisions which normally
come '^ndsr the treaty po-Trer^, but it went into effect on Novemver 4,
1S18.
V. C (5) The Kellogg ^act.
A recent example of an important treaty which seemed to
be in danger of defeat at the hands of a powerful minority of the
Senate was the Kellogg "Pact for Outlawing ^ar. The words of
Secretary of State, John Hay, that "no treaty on which discussion
T?as possible, no treaty that gave room for a difference of opinion
could possibly pass the Senate," seemed on the point of
being carried out in this inst.ance when Senator Moses of New Hamp-
shire offered a resolution of amendment to the Pact on riecember 15,
1328. The provisions of this amendment (l) would free the United
States from any obligation to coerce other nations to seek peaceful
means of settling international disputes; (2) would expressly deny
any limitation upon the working of the Monroe Doctrine; (3) would
prevent any impairment of the right of the United States to defend
ita own trade interests or territory; and (4) would deny that this

country should assume s,ny oblisation unier treaty to T^rhich the
United States is not a party.
These amendments sho'.v hov? little the Senate^ whioh
had no part in the negotiation of the treaty^ could be made to under-
stand the true n^caning of the Pact, The amendment failed to make
headway agai^.st pronounced public opinion favoring the treaty as
already negotiated and the assent of two-thirds of the Senate was
obtained. The Pact was signed immediately and has been hailed as
one of the moat important moves ever made for ending war.
VL.Suffir.ary and Conclusions
No other important country of the world has a rigid con-
stitutional check upon the conduct of foreign relations. In Great
Britain treaties are not the "supreme law of the land. " Parliament
votes upon them bat ordinarily merely ratifies without serious
comment on the treaties brought forward by its responsible ministry.
The re:iuireraent for legislative action to approve treaties in
foreign countries is a simple majority vote. Delay and fil ibusterin
such as occur coiCiiionly in the American Senate are almost unknown in
the legislatures of European countries. The ministry is responsible
for the approving vote upon the measure and can easily call for a
new election in case the legislative body opposed or amended the
treaty in a manner distasteful to the ministry. Thus public opinion
would have a direct control over foreign negotiations. Moreover
,
European Countries^ as a result of long submission to rabnarchicAl
power, have the theory that treaty-making should be trusted to the
executive and should rarely be interferred with by legislative or
popular action. As a result, foreign countries become impatient

with the American Governir.ent whiwih repeatedly has failed to
ratify treaties ^hioh apparently were entirely 5*tiafactory to
the executive powers concerned. One of the recent examples of
this kind was the alliance signed in good faith by President
Tilson in 1919 which promised help to France in case she was at-
tacked by the Germans. In return for this promise, France had
already given up her demand for the left bank of the Rhine. The
failure of the American Senate to approve the treaty left France
without a legal hold there and without the moral guarantee of the
United States which France was accepting as a substitute, (56)
It is doubtful whether the Leagre of Nations would ever have been
adopted, had it not been for the efforts of ^resident Wilson and
other influential leaders of the United States, yet the require-
ment of a two-thirds vote of the Senate prevented Arr.erican ad-
herence to the League.
Presiient '^ilson by taking the Senate more into his
confide.;ce iriight hav^. disarmed Senate opposition to his policies
but foreign powers can hardly be expected to understand the
American attitude toward these treaties.
An example of the kind of delay that can take place
in our legislature has been afforded by the formal annexation of
the Samoan -Islands by ^ simple ma;jority vote of the Senr.te, in
February 193S. Popular belief that the Islands had becin annexed
legally, had allowed them to remain f^r twenty-nine years under
the "extra-conatit : tional despotism" of the Na,vy Department. In
the words of the Heraid-Tribune as quoted on the Literay Digest [ij)
"President McKinley signed a simple executive order declaring eastern
fa.?;oi
-inder the control of the Department of the Mavy for a
nav-:.! station. This could hardly be a legal establishment of
r
sovarignity, and the Prsaiient Iw d not aesrri to havo regarded
it in that light.
"
The alternative to continued use of the Exec-o.tive
Agreements such as these described in detail above would be tc
require^ through an amendment tc the Constitution^ that consent. of
cnly a simple majority of the Senate or of Congress as a whole be
rec^uii'ed fcr approving treaties. The exeov.tive d^parti v _i. -^^.x .
yewars has increased its power enormously. Both President Roosevelt
and President '^ilson have extended their power: not only in ways
provided by the Constitution but also in ways hardly contemplated
by the framers of the Constitution, War emergencies have eaterded
executive functions to such an extent that peace-time executives
have been reluctant to return to the former circumscribed functions
of the President. The executive department has the confidence of
the public and has served its interests best in the past. The
people have seemed willing that the executive should take over extra-
legal duties.
There is nothing peculiarly sacred in the two-thirds
vote of the Senate fcr treaty-making. It was a result of compromise
in the Constitutional Convention. The requirement permits thirty-
three Senators to entirely blcc^ the wishes of an cverrhelming
majority of the Senate,, the House, the President ^ and the people.
The natural reaction against executive power is shown by the inser-
tion of Senate reservations in recent treaties. These seriously
iuipair the efficiency of the executive in foreign affairs and lead
tc the necessity for violating some of these provisions in order to
confront? special conditions as they arise. (5S)
The reqairement of a simple majority vote by the Senate
rculd be as efficacious in preventing secret treaties as the prose^t
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, two-thiria requirement. Tht. .idjd for executive agreerr^ents wc^ld
disappear and aecret agresmentB such as the one Prssident Roosevelt
is said to havs made or. July :jS,1905, could oe prevented. (59)
'u;.o^l soiurj Cx.cjri£i« in the treat y-ruaking req,uirement8
takes place ^ the demands of secrecy and immediate action will make
nacessary the sxoc.itive agreerjient. The agreement^ in theory at
least, can not be the "supreme law of the land. " under the CcnGti-
tuticn. It may be terminated more easily than a treaty since it is
an expression of a foreign policy of extra-legal nature. The ad-
vantages of the treaty over the executive agreement have been
recognized repeatedly. In the case of the Limitation of Armaments
on the Oreat Lakes, the President prer^ented the negotiations a
year later to the Senate for 'approval. President Roosevelt, while
contendin;r that the San Domingo agreement was necessary, admitted
t"-at a treaty would be far better and mere permanent.
There is little to indicate that any radical change in
the conduct of foreign affairs is contemplated. The struggle be-
tv/ear. the Senate and the Executive will continue with the advantage
probably remaining v/ith the President. A strong President will be
inclined to put into effect many treaty functions by executive
agreement while a weak President will be more inclined to follow the
dictate of the Senate. There has been a marked increase in the
number of diplomatic appointments which are not voted upon by the
Senate. These are technically unofficial but the President will
continually be censured by the Senate for failure to submit all
diplomatic norainati6ns to the Senate. Since the Senate rarely
opposes nominations for diplomatic positions, the President there-
by loses a great opportranity to secure the good will of the Senate
through consulting them.
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Ainendment of that part of the Constitution relating
to treaties is extremely unlikely as the Senate would harlly con-
sent to curtailment of its power even though the President were
obliged to give up all executive agreements. The only effective
check upon executive agreer.ent will be the Supreme Court which
may declare any or all executive agreements unconstitutional.
The Court, however -.vould need to dieting-aish bet^veen informal
agreements which are necessary for diplomacy and the more formal
agreements which take over the function of treaties. Up to the
present time no executive agreeir.ents have been passed upon by the
Courts. '
Certain types of Agreements stand out as important.
Perhaps the most legal of the more formal agreements entered into
without the advice and consent of the Senate are those which have
been made under Acts of Congress. The validity of the McKinley
Tariff ^ct, giving authority to the President which led to ten re-
ciprocal commercial arrangements, was upheld by the Supreme Court
by Fiell V.Clark a-s a ^r.easure necessary and proper for carrying cut
cert3.in po^vers of Conrress. (30} Under Acts of Congress, postal
arrangements,, copyright and trade marks have been protected. Many
of these have been by forrr.al treaty rather than by exec'itive agree-
ment even though the act of Congress author izi/ig agreements was in
effect. Extradition, with the exception of that between the
Philippines and British No^th Borneo, has been exclusively the
result of formal treaty. Protection of trade markb and patents
has been largely the result of treaty except where extra-terri-
toriality provisions have been made. Agreements were made vvith
Great Britain and some other powers that all oases of infringement
^
of patents and copyrights in China or Morocco should be tried in
r
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American cr British Oonsijilar (Courts. It is therefore difficult
to detern:ine by common practice -.vhat should be the proper limits
to the agreements made exclusively byC executive authority even under
l^^ials-'tive act,
A second claas of agreements relates to the settlement
of pecuniary claims. Here again, there seems to be no consistent
practice which would enable an observer to determine the limits of
such action. It is generally granted that all payments made by the
United States must have the sanction of formal treaties but claims
made by the United States against foreign countries are frequently
settled by executive agreements. In the past under various treaties,
including the Jay Treaty of 1797^, provisions have been made for
settlement of claims. The " Alabama " Claim which could easily have
brought about wax Tith '^-reat Britain was settled by a treaty which
submitted the claims to arbitriiticn.
The Executive A^irsement c^en frequently '^sed to
settle claims or tc refer claims to arbitration when the claims
were owed to the United States. The ''ora> Case which Spain tried
to modify shewed that ^;rhile the executive agre2ment may not be the
supreme law of the land it will be enforced at least d^jiring the
administration which made the original agree.-nent.
TCxecutive agreements ara often justified because of their
ability to extend the duration of treaties v/ithout incurring the
delays incidental to Senate action. For example, claims against
Haiti were settled under the Treaty of 1915 by arbitration. The
provisions of the treaty were extended by an executive agreement
for twenty years. The President, in his diplomatic position, is best
able to judge the need for a continuation of a treaty. Many execu-
tive agreements like those of the Behring Sea Seal Fisheries and the
r
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North Atlantic Coast Fiaherias which were a-3.j.e Icr a single
season have been renewed repeatedly^ thus having the aame prac-
tical function aa a permane^.t treaty. "Pach renewal may, however,
mean modification of the previous agreement so that interests
which operate over long periods of time may find the fut-ore pol-
icy of the government very uncertain. The fisheries agreement,
which lasted nearly half a oent'ury was infinitely better than a
hastily drawn up but permanent treaty settlement which would have
satisfied neither the United States nor Caiiada. Since 1?13, the
arrangements regarding fishing rights have settled all serious
disputes. Without the extra-legal power to make a modus vivendi
it is doubtful if the controversy over the fisheries could have
been completely • settled without the treat of war.
The material confidence and trust existing between
America and Great Britain have led to the greatest extension of
agreements between thess countries. Fven the arbitration treaty
which President Taft attempted to negotiate might have sr.oceeded
in securing the sanction of the Senate had it been made exclusively
with Great Britain. Beginning with the Limitation of Armaments on
the Great Lakes the list of agreements include such treaty subjects
as the cession of Horse-shoe Reef and the adoption of the final
boundaries under the surveys authorized by formal treaty. Indis-
criminate killing of fur seals has been stopped, first by agree-
ment and later by treaty. The Atlantic Coast Fisheries dispute of
over a century has been settled. Radio broadcasting has besn regu-
lated for British and American ships within coastal waters by execu-
tive agreement. An agreement betwe:=n these twc countries accepts
the "status quo" in respsct to oil and mining interests in Mexico.
r
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Property seized luring the "^orld ^ar under "trading-wi th-enemy
Acts" has been restored.
Executive agreements, as has been shown, have not been
made without Senate protest. The most successful attack made upon
this power of the President took place during the several attampts
at making arbitration treaties. In 1S05, the amendment of the general
arbitration treaties, making a " treaty " instead of an "Agreement "
necessary before arbitration of a pp^rticular dispute should take
place, was so objectionable to President Roosevelt that he dropped
all consideration of the treaty until 19CS. President Taft'a pro-
posal that a joint high commission of inquiry be esta-blished to define
the matters in dispute whenever occasions arose, was also unsatis-
factory to the Senate. In the case of the arbitration treaties^
hoTva\rer, the Senate controlled the Executive directly through its
power to amend treaties. Agreements not expressly prohibited by
treaties, such as the arbitration treaties, are still possibly iv-st
as thay have been in the past.
One of the most radical departures from the treaty require
ment of the Constitution was the agreement with Santo Domingo. The
protocol had been drawn up with the purpose of concluding a formal
treaty. Ttier, the Senate failed to vote upon the treaty and the
danger of interference by foreign powers became more pronounced.
President locsevelt decided to put the agreement into effect. It
worked successfully. Revolution was discouraged, although fifty-
five peiicent of the customs revenue was laid aside for the creditor
nations, the forty-^ive pei?-cent turned over to the Dominican Govern-
ment total»c/
- greater amount thar. that when the entire customs fe-
ceipta were delivered into the Dor.irican treasury. The Senate was

#91
inii.^nani oo^t public opinion took littla notice of the affair,
apparently being sa'tisfied 77ith the ^resident's action.
This policy of Roosevelt led to a similar arrangement
Tvith Nicaragua for the purpose of settling her financial diffi-
culties. As uo^-il niany cf the claims were extravagant or fraud-
ulent. The Taft Agreement was short-lived, however, as the Senate
voted against the arrangement for taking over the custom houses.
Financial disaster was finally averted by a treaty which in tetui'n
for 15,000,000 ceded Little and Big Corn Islands to the United
States as naval ba^es and provided for an option upon an inter-
oceanic canal through Nicaragua, In spite of predictions that a
second canal vrculd never be undertaken, the construction of the
ITicarag^jan Canal is one cf the problems facing "^resident Hoover.
Agreements which mirht have led to international com-
plic^itions were the Boxer Settlement in 1699, the Root-Tahahira
Agreement of 19CS, and the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1S17. The
first of these agreements in a large measure T^as responsible for
the success of Secretary Hay's Open '^ccr Policj'. A delay incidental
to the Senate confirmation of that agreement would have lost all the
prestige and
-influence which the United States had in that settle-
ment. The greiid cf the other pov/ers would probably have resultea in
a separate peace which seized all concessions, enlarged " spheres
of influence," and forever denied the principle of equal opportv<nity
in trade for all nations. The last two agreements, in as far as the
relate to Japan's influence in lianchuria, were open to serious crit-
icism. Nevertheless, no complications arose as a result of them.
President Harding wisely terminated the latter agreement by an ex-
change of notes.
cI
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The Armietice protocol of 18S8 vTith Spain contained
most of the provisions of the subsequent Treaty of Peace in 18SS.
Evacuatiori of the islands by t"^= Spanish troupa tock place before
the treaty was signed. There can be little doubt that the wording
of the armistice influenced and pre-determined the attitude of the
peace ccrrimissioners.
The Senate has little control over ?.n arinietice, "
concurrent resolutioii declaring a?:ainst any armistice was made a
few weeks before the armistice of November 11^1918 but without
visihle effeot. The necessity for prompt action to avoid further
bloodshed will always justify exclusive executive control over the
acceptance of an armistice rith a belli^-ersnt country. In time of
y/alT; as at no other time^ tl.o need for a sin£:le responsible execu-
tive is imperative.
The executive agreement is really an informal treaty not
having the advice and consent of the Senate. IThile its limitations
have never been defined, it is unlikely that Presidents v.ill submit
to a sharp curtailment of its use without a struggle. The history
of executive agreements during the period of one hundred and fifty
years under the Constitution, se-im to indicate that, -Tlthin certain
ill-defined limits they ''ire necessary for maintaining the prestige
and influence of the United States in diplomatic affaire.
End.
GM
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